A Marxian Model
of the
Exploitation of
the Slum Dweller

by
William Kelly

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Bachelor of Arts, Amherst College, June 1968.
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Ghettos are the consequence of the imposition of external power and the institutionalization of powerlessness. In this respect, they are, in fact, social, political, educational—and above all—economic colonies. Those confined within ghetto walls are subject peoples. They are victims of the greed, cruelty, insensitivity, guilt, and fear of their masters.

--from Youth in the Ghetto, a report by Harlem Youth Opportunities, Unlimited, (HARYOU)
Introduction

Hough, Harlem, Watts, the South Side—Americans in 1963, are very much aware of the "slum." They are fed daily by the mass media with reports, dispatches, photographs, television " specials," etc. which seek to educate, influence, and expose policy, reform, and reaction. The slum is readily identifiable to the citizen—he can read about it, see about it, hear about it; he can work with individuals from the "slum," he can drive through and walk around it. "It"—because it is geographically fixed and because "everyone" knows what one is speaking of when he refers to the "slum."

A sociologist however is not only a citizen in the society but a student of the society. As the former, he is charged with the responsibility of awareness of and action in the "slum problem," though it is questionable how many of his fellow citizens meet this obligation demanded of them by their living in a democracy. But as the latter, as a social scientist, he has a responsibility in another area. His academic position reflects a special skill as a student of society. As a member of the academy of sociology, he is charged with the explanation of social behavior. His responsibility is to observe as well as participate, to analyze as well as describe. The false claim of objectivity has been largely abandoned by academics lately, which is to the credit of their community, but if the sociologist cannot aspire or even desire to be "objective," he must maintain a certain detachment, which is both the price of his role and the privilege of his discipline. He is a student of his
society as well as a participant in it.

This distinction between citizen and sociologist is important because it underscores the distinction, too often neglected, between description and analysis. The newsman can rely on the citizen knowing what a slum "is," on a shared image of reality. The laymen knows the slum is dirty, is largely filled with non-whites, favors poor housing, fosters high crime rates, drug traffic, violence, and perversions of (his) values. The sociologist cannot remain satisfied with this reality; his discipline must proceed on another level of reality, the level of analysis. The reality of sociology is models, constructions of the mind which are presented to explain, make intelligible, that which may be described.

This thesis takes as its imperative the necessity of models. Although the slum of the American city of the 1960's may be recognized and pointed to and even dealt with by the citizen, we argue that the sociologist must respond to his special responsibility and offer models by which we may conceptualize the slum, models which we may use to organize our reality and make description meaningful and comprehensible.

To this end, we hypothesize that a model for the slum may be developed which is oriented toward the notion of conflict and is organized around the concept of class conflict. In particular, we will contend that the Marxian model of class conflict has a relevance as a model in analyzing the slum of the American city today.

The hypothesis is suggested on the basis of two assertions, both of which tested and documented. The first is that American sociology has been largely oriented around a particular view of society which has allowed
it to develop certain valuable models for the slum as well as for other areas of the society, but which has also constrained the discipline. This position of American sociology finds its most eloquent spokesman in Talcott Parsons; his emphasis on the integration of society, on equilibrium, on the importance of a consensus of values, is representative of the major American sociological tradition. Of particular interest to us is that this view deals with conflict as basically disruptive, dysfunctional, and pathological. The two important models that American sociologists have offered are the ecological model of Robert Park and Ernest Burgess and the stratification model of Lloyd Warner and his associates.

At the same time, the study of conflict has received very little consideration from sociologists since the first generation of the discipline, especially Karl Marx. It has only been within the last ten years or so that sociologists have returned to consider the problem of structural conflict and the importance of structural conflict for societal change. Louis Coser, of whom we shall speak later, is one of the few American sociologists to confront this problem; even his orientation is to a large extent that of Parsons.

One consequence of this renewal of interest in structural conflict has been a revival of concern with Marxian theory by others than those who are ideologically bound to defend to the latter the various Communist strains of Marxism. That is, recently sociologists have been examining the sociology of Marx to see if there are concepts and theory that may be of use to those who are committed to the discipline of sociology while not the "persuasion" of Marx. Ralf Dahrendorf, a German sociologist, has been significant in re-interpreting Marx.
American sociology has given us the ecological model and the stratification model of the slum. What we are suggesting is that there is another way of analyzing the slum and that is with the Marxian model of class conflict. Two corollaries are relevant here. Both relate to the nature of model-building and the nature of social science inquiry. That is, a proposal of an alternative to the two existing models is, in a sense, non-competitive. We are not trying to replace the ecologists, for example; the suggestion of an alternative does not invalidate their analysis. Rather, the class model is just that—an alternative. We are suggesting another way of explaining data and another basis on which to develop policy.

Models are non-competitive, i.e., not mutually exclusive, because of their relation to "reality." A news reporter endeavors to present "the way things are," the "facts." A model as a construction, as a configuration, is useful for analyzing "the way things are" in terms of "as if things were like..." It is this "as if" character of models, their hypothetical status which removes them from the level of description to an analytic reality.

After making a descriptive statement, the thesis will proceed to study the two models we have available in the context of the progress American sociologists have made in dealing with the slum, emphasizing the advantages and limitations of each.

We will then turn our attention to a discussion of Marx's theory of class conflict and the recent evaluations by Dahrendorf. To anticipate, we will find that the Marxian model, stripped of its philosophical trappings is that which is most useful in interpreting the data from the slum. By dealing extensively with data of the housing market in the slum, the
consumer-businessman relationship, and the unemployment and underemploy-
ment problem, we will show that one way of conceptualizing the relation-
ship of the slum dweller to the outside society is in terms of economic
exploitation. We will find that this exploitative structure of relation-
ships can be analyzed with the Marxian model; such an analysis will
allow us to say something about the nature of the slum as a phenomenon.
Finally, we will comment on the implications of this work for the citizen
and policy-maker as well as for future sociological research.
Chapter One
A Descriptive Statement and a
Review of Sociological Literature
on the Slum

To provide a descriptive basis for our analysis, we begin with a brief sketch of some of the characteristics of the slum of the American city today. We are not constructing an ideal-type slum but merely suggesting a number of characteristics that appear together empirically with some frequency.

We shall then consider some of the attempts of American sociologists to deal on the analytic level with the slum, including the two important models that we have available, the ecological model and the stratification model.

Characteristics of the Slum

Housing conditions. "Slums have commonly been defined as those portions of cities in which housing is crowded, neglected, deteriorated, and often obsolete. Many of the inadequate housing conditions can be attributed to poorly arranged structure, inadequate lighting and circulation, poor design and lack of sanitary facilities, overcrowding, and inadequate maintenance." (Clinard, 1965:4) Of all the characteristics, the physical conditions, especially housing conditions, have been emphasized.

There have been various attempts to establish standards for measuring
the quality of urban housing. The Census Bureau, for example, classifies poor dwellings as dilapidated or deteriorated. Dilapidated housing does not provide safe and adequate shelter, and deteriorated housing needs more repair than would be provided in the course of normal maintenance. According to the 1960 Census, the United States had 3,684,000 urban slum dwellings, of which 1,173,000 were "dilapidated urban units." David Hunter calculates that this figure means that 12.5 million people lived in slum areas. (1964:24)

Reliance on physical conditions may hide significant social realities, however. Some writers distinguish between the slum problem and the renewal problem. "The latter is concerned with how to construct, maintain, and rebuild those parts of the city in which buildings have become deteriorated or in which the facilities, although still in sound structural condition, have become so obsolete that they cannot be brought up to standards of health, comfort, and efficient operation." (Clinard, 1965:6) The slum problem on the other hand is "basically a problem of attitudes and behavior of people and of the indifference of the community to the neglect and victimization of the underprivileged." (Hunter, 1964:41) Gans observes: "obsolescence per se, alone, is not harmful, and the designation of an area as a slum for this reason alone is merely a reflection of middle-class standards-- and middle-class incomes." (Gans, 19 :310)

Overcrowding and congestion. In speaking of overcrowding, one must be careful to distinguish between the density of an area and the occupant per room rate. That is, in the downtown area, the former may include the very wealthiest of sections, where high-rise apartments may create a density equal to a tenement section. The factor of the number of people per room is a more reliable indicator. Michael Harrington estimates that
if the overcrowding of Harlem's worst blocks obtained for the rest of New York City, the entire United States population could be fitted into three of the boroughs of New York. (Harrington, 1962:70)

Again, the statistics imply social consequences of physical reality. Overcrowding obviously affects privacy, a factor that may be of great importance, especially in its effects upon interpersonal relations. "So far as the children are concerned, the house becomes a veritable prison for them. There is no way of knowing how many conflicts in Negro families are set off by the limitation caused by overcrowding people, who come home after a day of frustration and fatigue, to dingy and unhealthy living quarters." (Frazier, 1957:636) Overcrowding is also a factor in the congregation on street corners known as "street corner society." It is, in fact, a primary determinant in the whole relationship of "inside and outside."

Neighborhood facilities. A further characteristic of the slum is the inadequate facilities and community services. There are poor park facilities, schools of questionable quality, and insufficient welfare referral service. Often streets and sidewalks go unrepaired and uncleared; inadequate garbage collection adds to the filth of the physical environment. The question, of course, is one of relative deprivation. But the slum is generally that area of a city that suffers the most from the inadequacies of services.

Poor sanitation and health. Filth and disease are mentioned in all descriptions of the slum. The social aspect of disease is the unsanitary practices that are bred by and breed in the slum. Perhaps the best single index of general health of a community is its infant mortality rate. In 1961, this rate for Harlem was 45.2 per thousand live births as
compared with the 25.7 rate for the whole New York City area; in Hough, the rate is two times the Cleveland rate. (Clinard, 1966:9)

Deviant behavior. A high incidence of deviant behavior--crime, juvenile delinquency, prostitution, alcoholism, drug usage, mental disorders, suicide, illegitimacy, and family maladjustments--has long been associated with slum living. These are the so-called social pathologies of the slum. Hunter is typical of those who emphasize the relation between slums and crime. He estimates that in slums, accommodating twenty per cent of the population of the American city, there occurs about fifty per cent of all arrests, forty-five per cent of reported major crimes, and fifty-five per cent of reported juvenile delinquency. (Coleman, 1953:41) Clinard points out that the existence of unconventional values in slum areas accounts for high rates of such deviant behavior as juvenile delinquency. But as Whyte notes, not all those who live in slum areas are deviant. In any slum area, there exists simultaneously a conventional value system carried by certain individuals, churches, schools, police, etc. In fact, it is the impact of these two conflicting systems that implies social consequences of varying degrees for the individual. (Clinard, 1966:10)

Culture. The issue of the kind of culture (as a learned, shared way of life) in the slum is a controversial one. Clinard finds "the culture of the slum" to be largely "a synthesis of the culture of the lower class and of what Lewis has referred to as the "culture of poverty."" (1966:11) A recent analysis of the "American lower class" was done by Sydney
Miller, who outlines six focal concerns of lower class culture, concerns that apply to most slum areas. First, there is the concern over "trouble," an attempt to avoid it and in some cases to seek it. Second, there is a concern with "toughness," in that lower class men often feel the need to demonstrate physical prowess, "masculinity," and bravery. "Smartness" centers on the capacity to outsmart, outfox, con another without being taken oneself. "Excitement" and search for thrills is another characteristic, for example, the use of alcohol, narcotics, and gambling. Much emphasis is placed on fate or luck by many who feel that they have little control over forces affecting their lives. "Autonomy" is the last concern: "External controls and restrictions on behavior and authority that seems coercive and unjust are bitterly denounced, although often actually desired." (1964:21)

Unemployment, underemployment, and low wages are the rule in the slums. There is a constant struggle for economic survival. There is an almost complete lack of savings or even a desire to save, and there is little or no ability to plan for the future or to defer present gratifications of sense. Food reserves are often non-existent.

But a treatment of the slum as a product of poverty is too simple. Poverty is both an absolute and relative term. Particularly as our concern is with American slums, we shall be more concerned with the latter usage. As Clinard concludes: "The social aberration among the poor of the slums, as well as their apathy, is a product of their being the 'poorest' rather than their being 'poor,' and their alienation, apathy, and withdrawal from the general society appears to be maximal under slum conditions. In rural areas, the effects of poverty are counter-balanced by stronger traditions and group ties." (199:13) In any case we must distin-
guish the slum classes from the working strata—the latter are embracing and working toward middle class goals.

Apathy. The common denominator of the slum is its submerged aspect, its detachment from the city as a whole. The slum is viewed by the non-slum dweller as an inferior part of the city; hence its dwellers are looked down upon. The social isolation of the slum dweller finds its counter-part in the apathy and the disgust the slum dweller feels for the larger city, the larger society that puts before him, via media, so many prizes of and inducements to the "good life" and denies him the opportunity to earn them. "The attitude of the slum dweller toward the the slum itself, toward the city of which the slum is a part, toward his own chances of getting out, toward the people who control things, toward the 'system,' this is the element which as much as anything else will determine whether it is possible or not to do something about the slum. This is what makes slums a human problem rather than a problem of finance and real estate." (Hunter, 1964:13)

Brief Review of Sociological Literature on the Slum.

The great wealth of studies and data about urban areas that has been gathered in the last four decades, roughly since the twenties when Robert Park began his studies at the University of Chicago, allows us to discuss the characteristics of the slum with some confidence. But it is this ease that cautions us when we try to bring this data into a sociologically meaningful, theoretical context. For it is the task of sociology to explain behavior, to construct abstractions by which we may conceptualize behavior. As social scientists, we must move from the level of the purely descriptive to build models by ordering our empirical data,
and from models to theories of social behavior which structure an area of facts and transform it into an ordered context. It is with this sociological imperative in mind that we undertake to review the treatment of the slum by American sociologists of the decades since Park.

One could of course not pretend to be exhaustive in such a few pages. Rather, a review of the literature of urban sociology suggests three categories into which fall the major contributions to the sociologists' knowledge of the slum: a) sociological research which neglects to deal with its relation to theory; b) urban theory which offers no model for understanding the slum; and c) that literature which is based on the two models we have spoken of above. To be comprehensive we shall make mention of the first two categories and then deal in more depth with our two available models.

Our first category includes that material which we might call sociographic. Sociographic literature attests to the increasing attention among sociologists paid to the reporting of data—the monograph, for example—with little or no attempt to relate "findings" to theory. Too many sociologists are content with the level of description, the sociographic, and have neglected that which gives these studies relevance to the body of sociology—theory.

We are faced with, for example, a growing number of studies on residential patterns. Typical of this field is a collection of *Studies in Housing and Minority Groups* which seeks to demonstrate "the inequality of housing opportunities." An example of this collection is the monograph by Morris Eagle on "The Puerto Rican in New York City," which concludes an extensive examination of data with the following "outstanding charac-
teristics of Puerto Rican housing)

1. A very high proportion of families live in furnished rooms and apartments.
2. Families have insufficient space.
3. They live mainly but not entirely in the more deteriorated areas.
4. They live in old buildings in poor conditions.
5. They have inadequate service and facilities.
6. They pay high rents as compared with those paid by comparable groups. (Glazer, 1958:156)

There is no attempt in this or any of the other studies to relate these conclusions, which sound very much like the description of the slum that we discussed above, to any general theory; there is even no attempt to unite the seven studies which compose the collection to make some general conclusions about the relationship between housing opportunities and minority groups.

Another example of the sociographic is a book by Karl and Alma Tauber which studies patterns of residency of Negroes in a number of representative cities in the United States. The only conclusion that is reached is that urban segregation of the Negro is a consequence of economic discrimination (low income housing separated from high income housing), racial discrimination (white low income separated from Negro low income), and the movement of the whites to the suburbs. (Tauber and Tauber, 1966:21)

There is a second category of sociological literature on the city, and that is urban theory which attributes no special status to the slum. The most distinguished spokesman of this school is Louis Wirth. Wirth was writing in the thirties to correct what he thought to be the inadequate perspective of the ecologists (see below) by "selecting those elements of urbanism which mark it as a distinctive mode of human group life." (Wirth, 1938:48-9) The city for Wirth is a large, dense, perma-
nent settlement of socially heterogeneous individuals. The task of the sociologist is to look for patterns of social action and organization; Wirth identifies as the "schizoid" character of the urban personality that which comes from the necessary segmentation of the interpersonal relations that is the result of the large multiplication of persons interacting. Here the influence of Georg Simmel is obvious as Wirth finds contacts to be impersonal, transitory, and segmental. "The reserve, the indifference, and the blase outlook which urbanites manifest in their relationships may be regarded as devices for immunizing themselves against the personal claims and expectations of others." (1938:54)

We see clearly what Wirth is doing in this essay. While recognizing the "socially heterogeneous" nature of the city, he describes the urban personality in terms of an ideal-type, the characteristics of whom people in the city tend to approximate. As such, his theory is that there is one type of person that urban conditions favor and cultivate. This is precisely contrary to our purposes, as our concern is rather with trying to distinguish the slum from other areas of the city, to discover that which sets it apart. This might involve a psychological dimension, but Wirth, with his emphasis on finding the one urban personality, is of little value in our search. To be fair to Wirth, we must understand that in 1938, he was speaking out against what he found to be the simple-minded ecological theory then in vogue; as such his essay is a corrective overstatement. Nevertheless, while such a position was necessary then, it is of little utility to us now.

There is another important contribution to urban theory which we cannot use, because, as with Wirth, it offers no conceptualization of the slum. We are speaking here of the theory of social area analysis.
The theory of social area analysis is a recent sociological orientation developed by Eshref Shevky and Wendell Bell and later refined and tested by Bell (1955), Boat (1957), and Tyron (1955). Basically, the urban typology offered by Shevky is a classificatory schema in which social areas of the city are delineated as units of census tracts with similar configurations of scores on three statistical indexes. The assumption underlying his typology is this: that there are trends of increasingly industrial societies which can be expressed in terms of constructs and measured in terms of indexes.

The city is conceived of in the context of the larger society, as a product of the complex whole of the society. Thus, "social forms of urban life are to be understood within the context of the changing character of the larger containing society." (Shevky and Bell, 1955:23) For Shevky, the effects of industrialization on the city are to create an organizational transformation. He derives his constructs from certain postulates concerning industrial society. The problem of the city becomes a problem of organization, and a special kind of organization which arises from the demands of industrialization.

The increase in the scale of society creates changes in the distribution of skills, the organization of productive activity, and the composition of the population. These trends appear to be most descriptive for Shevky and Bell of the changing character of modern society. From this, three constructs of socio-economic rank, family status, and ethnic status, are developed. Census tracts are measured in terms of these three constructs by computing indexes for each construct. An examination of the configurations of the various tracts allows us to determine the
spatial loci of social areas.

We must note here that Shevky is speaking not of industrial cities but of the city in the context of an industrial society. That is, this industrial character has transformed society and as a result has created a demand for new forms of social organization. The city has changed in consequence to these demands to deal with these problems of organization. The city has not become just an industrial arena nor even industrially defined, but rather has become integrated with, become a part of a larger society whose character is industrial. Industrialization has influenced social organization in the society in general by redefining occupation and value, by re-structuring productive activities, and by creating significant shifts of population. The number and nature of occupations increases, and with this social status and mobility and organization become increasingly occupationally defined. The city as the most important social form of industrial society reflects this transvaluation.

What finally the social area analysts give us is a classificatory schema, a way of ordering available statistical data, a way of making census tract data meaningful and useful. But how useful is this to us? The indices of economic status, family status, and ethnic status, are derived from general assumptions about the character of the society. But these abstractions are not given any analytic edge; they are useful only in so far as they may describe the various social areas of the city. As such, the characteristics of the slum that we discussed above are given substantial backing, but in our search for a theoretical framework, the schema does not go beyond this description.

We may even take issue with the general assumptions of Shevky.
They are not too different in their implications from Wirth's position. That is, to posit an increasingly industrializing society assumes that these trends will continue; as we move steadily from primary production to secondary, industrial production to tertiary, service-oriented production, we expect our indicators in all areas of the city to demonstrate this. What Shevky's schema turns out to be in a larger sense is the measure of the distance from an absolute industrial index, towards which urban areas, cities, and societies approach. We may distinguish between areas of the city because some are closer to this ideal than others; social area analysis is then the typology of the difference in distance from this norm.

The dangers of this kind of approach should make us skeptical of its utility. While in the long range such a theory might be adequate, it gives us no 'middle range' analytic tools to understand the slum. It is simply the area of the city which is farthest from the industrial ideal. The schema places social organization on a scale; as such it is only descriptive.

Finally, we have the third of our divisions, comprising that theory which sees the slum as in some way(s) unique as an area of the city and which conceptualizes the differences in terms of a model. We will consider first the ecological school, centered at the University of Chicago, and then turn our attention to the work of Lloyd Warner and his associates and to their model based on the theory of social stratification.

Human ecology attempts to apply biological concepts in explaining certain aspects of human behavior. This perspective results in a particular view of the structure and quality of urban life. Ecological
research emphasizes space in its physical dimension; land use is
dealt with in terms of invasion, succession, and segregation. The
preoccupation with space leads ecologists to some interesting inter-
pretations of the rise of the city. The "moral order" of the community
has been of primary interest to Robert Park, and the underlying assump-
tion of the ecologists is that the "normative efficacy of spatially
inclusive communities declines in proportion to the urbanization of
society." (Park and Burgess, 1925:20) For Park, geographical contiguity
serves as the basis for social conduct and association out of which the
normative order develops. Social organization derives from proximity
and neighborly contact. The challenge of industrialism and hence of the
cities to this normative order is that they foster the development of
a new kind of association, an association based on commonality of inter-
est, based on occupation. This is non-spatial in its coordinates and
thus for Park is destructive of the moral order. The city as the child
of industrialism is seen to foster this second type of association.

The ecological perspective of Robert Park has been described by
one of his students, Gideon Sjoberg, as "studying man in his temporal
and spatial dimensions and explaining the resulting patterns in terms
of subsocial variables." (19:164) This statement is a fair evaluation
in so far as it emphasizes the notion of impersonal competition, one of
the fundamental ecological variables, but it tends to gloss over one of
the telling criticisms of Park's work. That is, basic to ecology is the
environment-organism relationship. But the environment of one organism
consists in part of other organisms; in this sense the ecological system
is related to the social system. Thus, the economic system includes
the organization of human activity towards resource utilization; it implies complex social processes in the necessity for large numbers of people to work in these interrelated activities. Any explanation of the environmental system then must consider these influences of the social system. This is the failure of the Chicago school: "Park failed to conceptualize adequately the resource utilization process as a social process, ignoring in particular, the economic system." (Beshers: 1962:24) It is not so much that ecologists rely wholly on subsocial variables but rather that they have failed to articulate the relationship between the ecological concepts and social concepts.

To this criticism, we may add a limitation of the ecological model. The influence of environment is critical to a social system, but the use of the organic analogy is deceptive. To say that the city represents a pattern of land use governed by laws the nature of which are biological rather than urban, is to deny the importance of social conflict. That is, the organic analogy does not consider that there can exist in structures certain tensions which create an inevitable, structurally generated conflict. Not only does Park fail to consider the social system in the resource utilization process, but he fails to consider that there may be structural tensions within this system which disturb the equilibrium.

An ecological description of the slum has been given by Zorbaugh and exemplifies both advantages and limitations of this model:

It is an area in which encroaching business lends a speculative value to the land. But rents are low; for while little business has actually come into the area, it is no longer desirable for residential purposes. It is an area of dilapidated dwellings, many of which the owners, waiting to sell the land for commercial purposes, allow to deteriorate, asking just enough in rent to carry the taxes... The city, as it grows, creates about its central business district a belt of bleak, barren, soot-begrin-
The slum then fits into the particular theory of land use developed by Burgess, which consists of a series of concentric circles; the slum develops as a consequence of the growth of the central business district and occupies the next wider circle. The theory is useful in so far as it emphasizes the relationship between the slum and the business district, and in so far as it, on a more general level, deals with the relationships between the areas of the city. But at the same time as it postulates some organic relationship between these two areas, circles, it does not consider the structural relationship between them; this is of course contrary to our hypothesis that evidence from the slum suggests there are in fact structural tensions that lead to a conflict relationship.

We may raise other objections to the ecological model which center around its inability to deal with structural conflict. While it speaks of succession, it does not, as we saw, consider the nature of conflict between the various circles; succession in the organic model implies accumulation. Further, it does not examine the structural relationship between occupational groups and 'natural areas.' The only "conflict" is the destruction that Park postulates of the moral order of the local area by the growth of the occupational groups; this however is more a competition of loyalties within the individual for Park, which results as the individual is increasingly drawn into the growing industrial production process.

For all of its limitations, the ecological model is useful as
Walter Firey demonstrates in his study of *Land Use in Central Boston*, in which he sets out to make explicit the relationship between the social process and the ecological process. Firey provides a conceptualization of the "non-intrinsic nexus of spatial adaptation." That is, the contribution of Firey has been to recognize that only when space is defined as "an objectifier for a cultural system does spatial placement have any significance for social interaction." (1946:32)

So if space gets its socially relevant characteristics through cultural definition and if social systems may locate in terms of social values, "there is obviously far more to the society-space relationship than an intrinsic nexus." (1946:32) The two propositions that Firey finds support for in his study of selected areas of central Boston are: "values (volitional adaptation) comprise one of the criteria by which certain social systems choose locations...; and interests (rational adaptations) dominate the spatial adaptations of certain social systems, but these interests come directly from the broader and larger cultural system." (Firey, 1946:86-7)

The second model, which we shall call the stratification model, is derived from the work of Lloyd Warner. One of his major concerns, which was developed in his *Yankee City* study, is that of identifying the levels of social structure, with dissecting society in terms of strata. Stratification involves a hierarchical ranking; although Warner refers to his groups as "classes," this is a misapplication of the term, as we shall argue below. For our discussion held, it will suffice to define class as Lipset and Bendix do: "the analysis of social class is concerned with the assessment of the chances that common economic conditions and common experiences of a group will lead to
organized action." (1951:248) On the other hand, "status, ranking by others, self-ranking, style of life, similar economic conditions, and income level are all factors which define social strata but not social classes." (Dahrendorf, 1959:76) Warner defines his groupings (which he calls classes) as follows: "by class is meant two or more orders of people who are believed to be, and are accordingly ranked by members of the community, in socially superior and inferior positions." (Warner and Lunt, 1941:82) So we see that he is really concerned with strata, which are units in hierarchical systems.

American society is best understood as a hierarchy for Warner, and in his Yankee City volumes, he divides the community into six such strata: upper-upper, lower-upper, upper-middle, lower-middle, upper-lower, and lower-lower. As the assumption of the concept of strata is empirical ranking, the categories are derived from an investigation of how the people in the community itself rank themselves and each other. Warner assumes that social distinctions are perceived by those to whom they apply; they are "...levels which are recognizable in the general behavior and social attitudes of the people of the whole community where the levels exist.

In Warner's study of Yankee City, the slum is represented as the area adjacent to the business district and "Riverbrook" (the slum dwellers are "Riverbrookers"). This is the description he offers in a later study, American Life:

The people of the lowest level, the lower-lower class, by social reputation are not respectable or are the pitied unfortunates. Sometimes they are the new "green-horns," the recently arrived "ethnic" peoples. These new people throughout American history, with their diverse cultural, linguistic, and religious backgrounds, have migrated here and settled. Starting at the bottom, they begin their slow ascent in our status system. They
differ culturally rather than racially from the dominant
group in America. Lower-lower class people live on the
river banks, in the foggy bottoms, in the regions in
back of the tanneries or near the stockyards and gene-
really in those places that are not desired by anyone
else. Their reputation is such that they are believed
to lack the cardinal virtues in which Americans pride
themselves. Although in standards of sexual behavior
many differ from the classes above, others are different
only because they are less ambitious and have little
desire to fulfill the middle-class goal of "getting
ahead." Their reputation for immorality is often no more
than the projected fantasy of those above them; as such
they become a collective symbol of the community's
unconscious.

(1953:76-7)

This description is derived from the way slum dwellers see their own
life situations and chances and the way this is seen by others in the
community (though the distinct impression one receives from reading
Warner is that the latter, in this case, has been given more weight
than with other groups.)

Though they are the "low men on the totem pole," Warner, with a
hierarchical view, posits a social mobility that includes even the lower-
lower. A stratification model can be useful in a situation in which there
are open statuses— that is, in which there is some significant mobility.
It is also valuable because it recognizes the importance of the image of
society perceived by the individual in that society; it considers how a
person sees himself relative to others and others relative to himself.
A stratification model can deal with prestige and with the notion that
individuals generally act according to their image of the way things are
rather than according to an objective (sic) reality. But the model has
limitations, particularly with the problem we are faced with, the slum.

*Black Metropolis* is a study of the Negro slum on the South side
of Chicago written by St. Clair Drake and Horace Clayton and based on
research carried out under Lloyd Warner. Not only is it valuable as a comprehensive and well-documented descriptive statement, but it represents the Warner model with its advantages and limitations. It makes extensive use of interviews and questionnaires to determine attitudes, prejudice, and values. For example, one of the areas of research is the boundary line around the slum that Negroes trying to relieve some of the increasing overcrowding within Black Metropolis are attempting to cross. This "racial no man's land" is analyzed by Drake and Clayton in terms of how the Negroes and whites perceive each other. "Even during a period when the Belt is not expanding there is always the possibility that an invasion may begin, and this is reflected in periodic 'scares,' as well as in the policy of business places on the margins of the Black Belt. Proprietors of taverns, drug stores, restaurants and neighborhood theaters are keenly sensitive to the moods of their clientele, and business places close to the Black Belt are likely to disapprove of colored patronage. This, in turn, antagonizes the Negroes and creates an additional source of friction." (1962:190) This is documented by a series of interviews with business owners and Negroes.

Black Metropolis is one of the first studies to focus on attitudes and ranking as a way of dealing with prejudice, but this concern with attitudes leads to an exclusion of considerations of the structural relations between the Negro slum dweller and the city around him. Although Black Metropolis documents exploitation, the theoretical model cannot ultimately deal with statuses of power and impotence, with relations of authority and exclusion from authority, with affluence and deprivation. A hierarchical model with its corollary of mobility may work well in analyzing the movement into and from the middle and upper strata, but
the problem of the slum and the lower-lower stratum may present, as
Drake implies, a different situation in which there is little upward
mobility, no gradual enbougeoisement. And interviews with slum dwellers
and businessmen may not be the best way to measure and conceptualize
the structural distance, the power differential between the two.

Related to this neglect of role and structural relations is the
particular view towards conflict that the stratification model implies.
Conflict for Warner assumes almost pathological dimensions. "Although
individual competition is seen as the very warp of the American democratic
structure, social conflict—especially class conflict is viewed as destroy-
ing stability and endangering the structure of American society." (Coser,
1956:24)

Coser believes that it is the anthropological bias in Warner's
work that contributes to his view that conflict is a dissociative and
disintegrative phenomenon; given anthropology's concern then for stabi-
ility, harmony, and integration, it seems likely that Coser is correct.
'Class analysis' as practiced by Warner and his associates consists of
the identification of various layers of people within a community who
have similar social positions and ranking and who associate on intimate
terms. The dimension of differential power, differential life chances
and differential interests among the members of the community are comple-
tely ignored, and thereby emphasis is shifted from questions about
conflict or potential conflict to questions about belongingness.

Both the ecological and the stratification models of the slum
reflect an orientation in American sociology which Coser documents as
developing after the first generation of "social reformer" sociologists
and which has received its most eloquent treatment from Talcott Parsons.
That is, the large proportion of American sociologists since that first generation of Ward, Veblen, and Cooley reflect the "common value orientation" that culminates in Parson's work. This orientation conceives of social structure in terms of a functionally integrated system held in equilibrium by certain patterned and recurrent processes. Thus, the main concern of Parsons is for those elements in social structure that assure their maintenance. As Coser says, "it may be said of Parsons' work beginning with The Structure of Social Action that it is an extended commentary on the Hobbesian question: how is social order possible?" (1956:20)

Parsons' work has been traced to his interest in the non-rational elements of economic behavior. "What appeared problematic to Parsons were not the rational conflicts of interest that preoccupied classical political economists, but rather the non-rational, non-contractual elements in contract which had escaped their notice." (Coser, 1956:20) Focusing on normative structures, which maintain and guarantee social order, Parsons was led to view conflict as having primarily disruptive, disassociating, and dysfunctional consequences. Parsons considers conflict as primarily a "disease," deviant behavior. In his essay, "Social Classes and Class Conflict," he introduces the medical analogy: "I believe that class conflict is endemic in our modern industrial society..." (1954:74) Coser concludes that "while by and large the men of the earlier generation were concerned with progressive change in the social order, Parsons is primarily interested in the conservation of existing structures." (1956:21)

Our review of the literature on the slum had suggested that the two most important contributions have been the models of Park and
Warner. Both of these models may be related to what has been the dominant consideration in American sociology, the equilibrium of the social system, a consideration which has been treated most extensively by Talcott Parsons.

In our review we have tended to emphasize the limitations of the models as opposed to their virtues; in all fairness, they have proved very useful in sociologică analysis. But we may defend our emphasis on the grounds that we are concerned with suggesting that the way in which conflict is treated, or more correctly, dismissed, by the models and by the whole of the "Parsons" orientation leaves open the possibility for new models which will consider more seriously the idea of conflict. This will be our task in the next chapter when we examine two models which are based on structural conflict.
Chapter Two

Two Models of Structural Conflict

The German sociologist, Ralf Dahrendorf, argues that to the general question of why societies cohere two views have stood in conflict throughout Western social thought. There is one school of thought according to which social order results from a general agreement of values which outweighs all possible or real differences of interests and opinions; there is another school that "holds that coherence and order in society are founded on force and constraint, on the domination of some and the subjection of others. The two positions are not mutually exclusive, but Dahrendorf holds that there is a real difference between Aristotle and Plato, Hobbes and Rousseau, Hegel and Kant. (Dahrendorf, 1959:157)

These philosophical positions have passed into scientific inquiry and influence questions of social science, but not without qualification. The sociologist who emphasizes coherence by consensus does not claim that order is based on a general consensus of values, "but that it can be conceived of in terms of such a consensus, and that, if it is conceived of in these terms, certain propositions follow which are subject to the test of specific observation." (Dahrendorf, 1959:157) Similarly, the assumption of the coercive nature of social order is a "heuristic principle" rather than a judgment of fact. When translated into sociology, the philosophical positions become theories of society. There is then the integration theory of society which conceives of social structure in terms of a functionally interrelated system held in equilibrium by
certain patterned and recurrent processes, and there is the coercion theory of society which views social structure as a form of organization held together by force and constraint and "reaching continuously beyond itself in the sense of producing within itself the forces that maintain it in an unending process of change." (Dahrendorf, 1959:159)

We must remember that we are dealing with theories, and as such they are not mutually exclusive. "There are sociological problems for the explanation of which the integration theory provides adequate assumptions; there are other problems which can be explained only in terms of the coercion theory; there are, finally, problems for which both the theories appear adequate." Dahrendorf, 1959:159) They are aspects of the same reality.

This serves as the theoretical statement behind our work. Our review of the existing literature of the slum has given us two models for understanding the slum, those of the ecological and stratification schools. We have found that both models represent what we have identified as the Parsonian tradition in American sociology (Parsons being the most eloquent, not the earliest, of this tradition). The tradition clearly represents the integration theory of society. What we hypothesize, in offering models which deal explicitly with the issue of conflict, is that the problem of the slum is one for which both the above theories are appropriate; and that without denying the utility of either the ecological or the stratification models, we may develop models of conflict which are based on the opposing orientation, the coercive theory, and which are equally valid and useful in a sociological analysis of the slum.

It is surprising to find when one undertakes such a hypothesis that there has been little work by sociologists with structural conflict.
One is forced to conclude with Coser, that "even a cursory examination of the contemporary work of American sociologists clearly indicates that conflict has been very much neglected indeed as a field of investigation." (Coser, 1956:16) A study of the sociological literature of conflict yields only two models of significance, which we will discuss and compare to determine if either are relevant to the problem of conceptualizing the slum. We refer here to the model of class conflict of Karl Marx and to the conflict model offered by the German sociologist, Dahrendorf.

In this chapter then we shall be concerned with presenting these two models which are based on the notion of structural conflict. In chapter three, we shall examine evidence from the slum which suggests structural exploitation and then in the last chapter, analyze this data in terms of the two models of conflict in order to determine if either are useful for the sociologist in understanding, in analyzing, the slum.

We are led to Marx from two directions. First, we saw that American sociologists, indebted to Parsons and oriented around the integration view, do not give sufficient attention to the notion of conflict. Marx, on the contrary, has given us the most famous treatment of the opposite orientation; his emphasis on conflict models in capitalist society suggests possibilities in conceptualizing certain aspects of slum behavior. Also as we shall see in the next chapter, we have certain evidences of exploitation in the slum; if we can relate this exploitation to a model of antagonism and conflict, then Marx may be of some relevance. Thus, we turn to his theory of class, to examine its elements, to discuss the theory in terms of structural changes in industrial society since his
time, and to assess any contemporary utility in his concepts and theory for our study of the class.

The first task we face is to exorcise the concept of class from its consistent misuse by American sociologists, who have applied it as a synonym for stratum, a descriptive term referring to social stratification. American sociologists have generally denied any value to Marxist concepts, but they have not hesitated to borrow the term "class" for their purposes.

Dahrendorf, in his study, "Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society," locates the historical derivation of the term in the early nineteenth century: "the concept of class in its modern formulation is in fact the result of a definite historic situation." (1959:7) Pre-industrial society had been a relatively static social order and "distinctions of rank" rested as much on a myth of tradition, an intricate system of age-old, often codified, rights and duties, as on the comparatively crude gradations of property, power, and prestige. The basis of the position of the landlord, the craftsman, even the fief, was legitimization by authority of tradition.

This is precisely the feature that the Industrial Revolution eliminated. Two new strata, the entrepreneurs and the workers, emerged with no tradition of rank, no myth of legitimacy; "industrial capitalists and laborers had no 'natural,' no traditional unity as strata... for these strata, bare of all tradition and differentiated merely by external almost material criteria, the concept of class was first used in modern social science." (1959:6) And it was Marx who was one of the first to turn his attention to this development.
An attempt to deal briefly with Marx's works is doomed to failure, but we shall try to avoid the pitfalls of a general discussion by concentrating on that which is centrally important to all of Marx's works, his theory of class. It is here that the three roots of his thought are joined. "Marx adopted this word from the early British political economists; its application to 'capitalists and proletariat' stem from the French utopian socialists; the conception of the class struggle is based on Hegel's dialectics." (in Dahrendorf, 1959:9) The theory is also the link between his sociological analysis and his philosophical speculation. Thus, we must turn to this problem, after examining the theory, of the relation between these two activities, how they may be separated, and the consequences of this separation for his theory.

It is useful to begin with Marx's analysis of his own society. The capitalist society around him Marx saw to be divided into capitalists and proletariat. The former possessed effective private property, had control of the relations of production. Correlated with this, authority and power were also in control of the owners of the factories; they had socio-economic position as a result of the correlation of power, wealth, and status. The workers, on the other hand, were dependent, by labor contract, on the factory owners. The correlation was a subsistence wage, exclusion from power, and low status. This difference in position made for conflicting groups, classes, which fought each other. Marx recognized the presence in industrial society of other persons who did not fit into either class, e.g., landowner, peasant, etc. These groupings, however, were thought to decrease not only in number but also in importance in determining the outcome of society's conflicts. "Society is dominated by the antagonism between the interests of those who elevate their non-
possession into a demand for a complete change of the property relations.

Marx's concern was with the process of societal change, not structure. We may simplify his processes to four: there is the tendency for classes to polarize increasingly; as this occurs, their class situations become increasingly extreme; the two classes become more and more homogeneous internally; and finally, as this is carried to its extreme, the fabric of society breaks, and a revolution terminates capitalist society. His analysis therefore involves radical change.

Marx's search for a theory of class stemmed from these observations of capitalist society in England and his commitment to revealing the economic laws of the development of modern society. Marx sought the scientific laws by which he could understand and predict social change in the industrial period and hence all of history. It is this which leads him to the "class struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat as the great lever of modern social change." (Dahrendorf, 1959:9) The emphasis is on change for Marx thought that history could be understood only when the scientist has uncovered the laws of social change. And change, for Marx, implies conflict: "With the moment in which civilization begins, production begins to be based on the antagonism between accumulated and direct labor. Without conflict, no progress; that is, the law which civilization has followed to the present day. Until now the forces of production have developed by virtue of the dominance of class conflict." (Marx, 1936:70)

Marx was not content with the prevalent notion of class as social groups whose components have a common source and level of income.
These he felt were criteria belonging to the realm of distribution and consumption. For Marx, "distribution is itself a product of production; the kind of participation in production determines the patterns of production distribution, the way in which people participate in distribution." (Marx, 1904:250) What is important is production and the power relations it determines.

The essential condition that determines the mode of production of an epoch and that therefore provides the constituent element of classes as well as the momentum of social change is property. But we must understand property in the context of the particular society; in bourgeois society it is the control of a minority over the wealth of a whole nation. This is the core of the antagonism existing in production and creating class conflict. "The essential condition of the existence and domination of the bourgeois class is the accumulation of wealth in the hands of private persons, the formation and augmentation of capital; the condition of capital is wage labor." (Marx, 1955:15)

Thus we look to the relations of production as the core of the notion of class. There are three implications of these relations in bourgeois society. The first is that the division of wealth in the sphere of distribution corresponds to the division of property in production. Thus, a person’s material conditions, his class situation, is based on his place in production. But the common situation of similar economic conditions is not sufficient for the formation of a class; they do not produce real antagonism.

The second consequence of the distribution of property is that it determines the distribution of political power in society. "The political power of the bourgeoisie arises from these modern relations of
property." (Dahrendorf, 1959:13) Thus, authority relations in production determine authority relations in general.

The third consequence is that relations of production shape the ideas that mold the character of the period. "The ruling ideas of a period have always been nothing but the ideas of the ruling class." (Dahrendorf, 1959:14) "The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas: i.e., the class, which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force." (Marx, 1961:212)

"Individuals form a class only in so far as they are engaged in a common struggle with another class." We have seen that the basis of class formation is in the relations of property and authority. But we must ask, what is the motivation of class formation? The force that effects class formation is class interest. Class interest exists beyond the private interest of an individual; the substance of these class interests can be expressed in a number of ways, in so far as they are based on the economic positions of given groups. For the proletariat it is the wage, for the bourgeoisie it is profit. On the basis of these class interests, in fighting to realize or defend them, the groups determined by the distribution of property in production, and by the distribution of the political power flowing from it, organize themselves into classes.

For Marx, the formation of classes always means the organization of common interests in the sphere of politics. Classes are political groups united by a common interest. Thus:

every movement in which the working class as such opposes the ruling class and seeks to destroy its power by pressure from without is a political movement. The attempt, for example, to extort a limitation of working time in a single factory or trade....

(quoted in Dahrendorf, 1959:14)
Every class struggle is a political struggle. It is the deliberate and articulate conflict between two opposed interests, the interests, respectively, of preserving and of revolutionizing the existing institutions and power relations.

Marx's vision was of a classless, which he found confirmed in scientific laws. "The working class will in the course of development replace the old bourgeois society by an association which excludes classes and their conflict, and there will no longer be any political authority proper, since it is especially the political authority that provides class conflict within bourgeois society with its official expression." (Marx, 1936:188)

Dahrendorf, in commenting on Marx's theory of classes, draws a distinction between Marx's sociological elements and his philosophical speculation (the distinction is more properly between empirically testable hypotheses and propositions removed from empirical test), and we shall find it valuable to use these distinctions. There are a number of elements in Marx's sociology of classes which we may now summarize and point out those places where it intersects with his philosophical vision.

(a) We must emphasize the heuristic purpose behind the concept of class. Marx does not use the term as descriptive of society at some existing time and state. It is rather analytic and dynamic (as opposed to descriptive and static). "...For Marx, the theory of class was not a theory of a cross section of society arrested in time, in particular not a theory of social stratification, but a tool for the explanation of change in total societies." (Dahrendorf, 1959:19)
(b) Marx is often criticized for the seemingly simplified, two-class model of capitalist society, but it must be understood in light of the heuristic purpose. If his purpose had been purely descriptive, to be sure he would have recognized a number of groupings. But, "not only are the unstable entities destined to be drawn sooner or later into the two great whirlpools of bourgeoisie and proletariat, but even if this were not the case, their historic role would be insignificant by comparison with that of the dominant classes of capitalist society." (Dahrendorf, 1958:20)

(c) Marx's notion of the formation of classes raises an important question. We will recall that the formation of classes depends for Marx not on the differences of income but on "property"—that is, property as an effective force in production, as "ownership of the means of production," "The authority relations resulting from the distribution of effective property in the realm of production constitute the ultimate determinant of the formation of classes." (Dahrendorf, 1958:21) The question then arises as to what Marx meant by the "relations of property" or production; does Marx mean by that the relations of factual control and subordination in the "enterprises of industrial production"—or merely the authority relations in so far as they are based on the legal title of property? Is property to be conceived in a loose, sociological sense (exclusiveness of legitimate control) or merely "as a statutory property right in connection with such control"? Is property a special case of authority— or is authority a special case of property? The significance of this issue is pointed out by Dahrendorf:

If one works with the narrow concept of property, class conflict is the specific characteristic of a form of production which rests on the union of ownership and control. In this case, a society in which control is exercised, for example, by state functionaries, has by definition neither classes nor class conflicts. If on the other hand, one works with the
wider concept of property, class structure is determined by
the authority structure of the enterprise, and the category
of class becomes at least potentially applicable to all rela-
tions of production."  

(1959:21)

A number of Marx's recent critics have demonstrated that he in fact
relied on the narrowing interpretation of property. This as we shall see
allowed him to link his sociology with his philosophical position
but also ultimately jeopardized his theory for our purposes. For Marx,
then, the relations of production as a determinant of class formation
are also authority relations, but they are such only because in the first
place they are property relations in the narrow sense of the distribution
of controlling private ownership.

(d) Crucial to Marx is the notion that while classes are founded
on the relations of production in an economic sense, they become
socially significant only in the political sphere. Related to this is
the idea that classes do not constitute themselves as such until they
participate in political conflicts as organized groups. On the norma-
tive and ideological level of social structure, it involves the articula-
tion of "class-consciousness," i.e., the transformation of objective class
interests into subjectively conscious, formulated goals of action. The
complete class is characterized not by a common, though conscious, direc-
tion of behavior, but by its conscious action toward formulated goals.

(e) The wider context of Marx's theory of class formation is his
vision of class conflict as the moving force of social change. It is
here that Marx, the sociologist, and Marx, the philosopher, become intangled.

We may summarize his theory as follows:

a) In every society, there is possession of and exclusion
from effective private property. In every society, there
is therefore possession of and exclusion from legitimate
power. The relations of production determine the diffe-
rent class situations.
(b) Differentiation of class situations toward the extremes
of possession of and exclusion from property and power
increases as a society develops.
(c) As the gap between the class situations grows, the con-
ditions of class formation, i.e., of political organiza-
tion and of the explicit formulation of class interests--
mature. The political class struggle between oppressors
and oppressed begins.
(d) At its climax, this conflict produces a revolutionary
change, in which the hitherto ruling class loses its
power position and is replaced by the hitherto oppressed
class. A new society emerges, in which a new oppressed
class grows up, and the process of class formation and
class conflict starts anew.

(f) Finally, Marx's sociology involves a particular view of
society which we have already made mention of. For Marx, society is not
a smoothly functioning order of the form of a social organism. Rather,
the dominant characteristic is the continuous change of not only its
elements but of its very structural form. Thus, conflict is an essential
feature of social reality; organized conflict is a product of the struc-
ture of society itself.

This then is the Marxian model of classes. The important authority
relations in society are the relations of production. These relations
define various social groupings, which by virtue of their possession of
or exclusion from property are in conflict with one another. In capita-
list society, these groupings are the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.
The structural antagonism of these relations of production creates open
conflict as consciousness of the objective, dominance-subjection relation-
ship grows within members of the opposing social groupings. "Classes"
are formed when this "class consciousness" motivates the groupings into
political action. It is this action that makes classes the agents of
structural change.
We have spoken of the combination of sociology and philosophy that we find in Marx's thinking, and in (e) above we have suggested the direction in which Marx moves from sociological analysis into a philosophy of history. We may raise the question of whether we can legitimately separate the two, whether we, as sociologists, can separate out Marx's class model from his larger concerns of polemical speculation. Our interest is in an analytic model and not philosophical trappings. Can we make such a distinction in Marx's work?

The answer is to the affirmative because of the unique position of the theory of class in Marx's total view. "Class" is both the heuristic device that Marx devises to analyze the society around him and the crucial concept in his speculative philosophy of history. What we are doing is emphasizing the former context; we are choosing to judge the notion of "class" as a model based on its utility for analysis, not as a descriptive label, based on its philosophical validity.

Our question of whether we may extract the model from the philosophical context, then, is unnecessary, because there are two contexts. In separating the two, we do not deny that which is common to both—his theory of class; we are merely affirming its possibilities for sociological analysis. We do not use "class" for polemics— or for our own schema of history ( Lenin); remembering our discussion in the introduction (p. 2-4), we use it as a model and as such submit it to empirical hypothesis. This will come in the next chapter when we consider the problem of the slum.

A contemporary alternative to the Marxist model is that of Dahrendorf. Dahrendorf begins with the common observation that there have been certain
structural changes in the societies that Marx was observing in the nineteenth century and that these changes might be of such magnitude as to cause a re-evaluation of Marx. This is his hypothesis—that the changes have been of such significance that a new model of structural conflict must be considered.

Dahrendorf draws a distinction between industrial and capitalist society. He uses Weber’s definition of capitalism—“it is one of the fundamental properties of capitalist private economy that it rationalizes on the basis of strict calculation, and that it is structured systematically and soberly by the economic effect intended” (in Dahrendorf, 1959: 38)—to show that capitalism generally refers to a particular form of industrial production, historically grounded in the type of production found in the industrializing countries of western Europe in the nineteenth century. As such, capitalism is a historical concept, merely referring to one form of industrial society. Industrial society is a more general concept, referring to "those factors which can be shown to be generated by the structure of industrial production and which cannot disappear unless industrialism disappears." (1959: 39) Capitalism on the other hand involves private property and the control of the market by private initiative. . . We are in a post-capitalist society, Dahrendorf argues, and we must consider the changes that have taken place within the industrial context.

Developments in the late nineteenth century, e.g., the emergence of the joint stock company, led to the decomposition of the capitalist class. The distinction that developed in these corporations was the division between ownership and control. With shareholders, those who owned the company were no longer the same individuals who controlled,
operated the company; the capitalist class was divided into owners and managers. With this differentiation of roles, the class as a class has changed, for the implication of the replacement of capitalists by managers is that recruitment is now through bureaucracy and professional career. More important, there is a change in the issues that cause conflicts, "for the interests of the functionaries without capital differ from those of full-blown capitalists, and so therefore do the interests vis-a-vis their new opponents." (1959:47)

There has also been a differentiation in the labor class, contrary to Marx's prediction that workers would tend toward the unskilled. The requirements of industrial production have demanded more and not less skill. Consequently, the proletariat has become both diversified and stratified. There are workers of the unskilled, semi-skilled, and skilled categories, and within each category, there is a wide range of specialties. Thus, the movement from a capitalist society to a post-capitalist society has appeared to involve the disruption of one of Marx's tenets—the homogeneity of the two opposing classes.

A related development has been the emergence of a new group, the "middle class." This presents a theoretic difficulty to the Marxist in so far as his theory can have no "middle" class. That is, if our concern is not patterns of social stratification, but rather lines of conflict, one thing is clear: however we choose to delimit the aggregate of salaried employees, they are not a middle class, because from the point of view of a theory of conflict, there can only be opposing classes. A class cannot stand in the middle.

Several other factors of change in industrial society have raised problems for Dahrendorf with Marx's model. Social mobility, which Marx
had assumed to be non-existent, has on the contrary become institutionalized; a number of sociological studies recognize and support this. The consequences for a theory of class are obvious. Where mobility within and between classes is a regular occurrence and therefore a legitimate expectation of many people, conflict groups are not likely to have either the permanence or the consciousness of caste-like groups composed of hopelessly alienated men. Also, as the individuality of classes grows, the intensity of class conflict diminishes. Instead of advancing their claims as members of homogeneous groups, people are more likely to compete with each other as individuals for a place in a higher status.

Another development has been what Geiger calls the "institutionalization of class conflict."

The tension between labor and capital is recognized as a principle of the structure of the labor market and has become a legal institution of society. The methods, weapons, and techniques of the class struggle are recognized—and are thereby brought under control. The struggle revolves according to certain rules of the game. Thereby the class struggle has lost its worst sting, it is converted into a legitimate tension between power factors which balance each other. Capital and labor struggle with each other, conclude compromises, and thereby determine wage levels, hours of work, and other conditions of work.

(Geiger, 1932: 183)

Obviously one of the reasons that this institutionalization occurs, or rather what it is an explicit recognition of, is the change in the relationship of the two classes. That is, no longer are the relations characterized by the complete control of and exclusion from, respectively, authority. Compromises are concluded between two groups, each of whom has a bargaining position.

Thus, Dahrendorf claims there have been a number of significant structural changes in the transition to post-capitalist society. At the
same time, he discovers that while the structure has undergone these changes, paradoxically, the values underlying the structure have merely advanced. These values are, for example, rationality, achievement, and equality. There are also structural elements which have remained intact; these include social stratification and authority relations. With regard to authority relations, they are even of the same type in both capitalist and post-capitalist society. It is, in Weber's terms, "rational authority" based "on the belief in the legality of institutionalized norms and the right of command on the part of those invested with authority by these norms." (quoted in Dahrendorf, 1959:71) Finally, we continue to recognize the social inequality of these authority relations; this seems to pervade the structure of all industrial societies and provides the determinant and the substance of most conflicts and clashes.

But Dahrendorf focuses on the changes rather than the continuities in industrial societies; because of this, he develops a reinterpretation of "class" which emphasizes "the separation of ownership and control," whereby today's industrial organizations are increasingly comprised of "capitalists without function" (stockholders) and "functionaries without capital" (managers). For Dahrendorf, once control is separated from ownership, the concept of property, so critical a variable in Marx's analysis, is no longer relevant to class formation. Property as a right to exclude others from the use of an item is in other words a form of authority. It is, however, only one form of authority. Wherever there is property, there is authority, but not every form of authority implies property. Authority is the more general social relation. Accordingly, class conflict is best seen as arising out of a dispute over the distribution of authority in a given authority structure.
A theory of class for Dahrendorf develops from the total authority matrix of the social relations of a society as opposed to Marx's notion that the only significant relations are economic. His theory of class has two aspects, class formation and class conflict. The basis of formation is the "imperatively coordinated association," an organization within which "some positions are entrusted with a right to exercise control over others in order for effective coercion." (1959:165) By this, he considers virtually all organizations of the social system "since imperative coordination, or authority, is a type of social relation present in every conceivable social organization." (1959:167-168) The state, a church, an enterprise, but also a political party, a trade union, and a chess club, are all associations in this sense.

The structural determinant of conflict groups is authority as exercised in these associations. Authority is dichotomous; there can be only two conflict groups as there is only dominance and subjection. Dahrendorf recognizes that there are differences between those who have a great deal of authority and those who have only a little; but he argues that the differences within each category do not affect the existence of a borderline between those even with a little authority and those without any. In every association there is a plus side of authority, consisting of those who participate, to any degree, in its exercise, and a minus side, comprising those who are completely excluded from it.

The different positions in associations involve for their incumbents, conflicting interests. The domination-type authority relation is characterized by an interest in maintaining the social structure that for it conveys authority, while the subjection-type authority relation involves an interest in changing a social condition that deprives its incumbents
of authority. "In every association the interests of the ruling group
are the values that constitute the ideology of the legitimacy of its rule,
whereas the interests of the subjected group constitute a threat to this
ideology and the social relations that it covers." (1959:177) Dahrendorf
distinguishes two types of interests. Latent interests are "under-
currents of (one's) behavior which are predetermined for him for the dura-
tion of his incumbancy of a role...." Under certain conditions, these
become conscious goals, manifest goals. "The specific substance of mani-
ifest interests can be determined only in the context of given social
dependencies; but they always constitute a formulation of the issues of
structurally generated group conflicts of the type in question." (1959:178)

There are two stages in conflict group formation in the Dahrendorf
model, quasi-groups and interest groups, corresponding to latent and
manifest interests. Latent interests are articulated into manifest interests.
Quasi-groups are the recruiting fields for organized interest groups of
the class-type. The members of the quasi-groups share certain character-
istics and have common latent interests; they share the same relation
to authority in an association. Interest groups are groups in the strict
sense of the sociological term; they are the agents of group conflict.
They have a structure, a form of organization, a program or goals, and
a personnel.

The model considers certain variables which operate to affect both
the intensity and the violence of class conflict. Among those that tend
to decrease the intensity of conflict are the extent of the conditions
of class organization, the extent to which class conflicts in different
associations are dissociated, and the extent to which the distribution
of authority and the distribution of rewards in an association are
dissociated (and not superimposed). "The violence of conflict tends to
decrease to the extent that the conditions of class organization are
present, if absolute deprivation of rewards and facilities on the part
of a subjected class gives way to relative deprivation, and the extent
that class conflict is effectively regulated." (1959:239)

Dahrendorf is particularly vague on the question of the function of
conflict. He implies that conflict may introduce change both of the
structure and within the structure. With reference to this, he attaches
two postulates to his model: "the radicalness of the structural change
covaries with the intensity of class conflict, and the suddenness of
structural change covaries with the violence of class conflict." (1959:240)

The fundamental difference in the Marxian model and Dahrendorf's
model is the issue of the determinant of class formation. Marx posits
that the relations of production, the economic relations, are the crucial
relations in society and that classes are based on the possession of or
exclusion from property. Dahrendorf holds that the replacement of the
capitalist character of our industrial society by a post-capitalist situa-
tion has created the need to define classes by relations of any authority
(including, among others, economic); the important issue becomes the pos-
session of or exclusion from authority.

Both however develop a two stage model of class formation. A group
for Marx becomes a class only when a class consciousness, a conscious
recognition of its situation, develops, and the group moves into poli-
tical action to effect or prevent structural change. Dahrendorf conceptua-
lizes this in terms of interest groups which arise from quasi-groups as
latent interests become manifest.
Chapter Three

The Structural Exploitation of the Slum Dweller

We have examined various characteristics of the slum of the American city and have shown how the attempts of most sociologists to deal analytically with this area of the city have been incomplete because they have neglected the importance of structural conflict. We have in the last chapter discussed the two most significant models that are available to the sociologist to deal with structural conflict. We now turn our attention in this chapter to several situations in which the slum dweller is exploited by elements of the outside society. That this exploitation is an important characteristic we will detail in three areas: consumer exploitation, housing exploitation, and the problem of the hard-core unemployed and underemployed.

Once we have examined these situations we can proceed to determining the relevance of the models we have developed above in rendering these situations sociologically meaningful. If we can relate the exploitation of the slum dweller to one of our class conflict models, then we will be in a position to understand the phenomenon of the slum as a function of this exploitation. But this will be our task in chapter four.

Now, however, we are concerned with exploitation, and in this chapter what we will be looking for is the structure of exploitation, the ways in which the slum dweller is exploited by the structure of his relationship to the outside city.(as opposed to exploitation by idiosyncratic
behavior or individual practices).

Consumer exploitation in the slums.
Consumer patterns in slum areas have been a long-neglected research problem, but recent studies by several groups at Columbia University have yielded some detailed data of these patterns for residents of sections of Central Harlem and the lower East Side of New York City. The study which we shall investigate in particular took as its sample, residents of four public housing projects in Harlem and the lower East Side. The families of the sample tested tended to be young (average head of household was thirty-five), "complete" (71% with both heads of household), with a median income of $3500 (10% had incomes below $2000). Fifteen per cent derived all of their income from welfare, 13% lived on pensions, and 72% from earnings. Close to half were Puerto Rican, 29%, Negro, and 25%, white; only 17% were born in New York City.

The statistical portrait of the sample indicates that these consumers are generally products of a traditional culture. "Their place of origin, their race and ethnicity, and their level of education all suggest that their early training was not geared to life in highly urbanized and bureaucratic society." (Covlovitz, 1963:11) The economy of the low-income area becomes the structure which is set up by the local merchants to exploit this consumer poverty and ignorance.

We might question the use of project house data as representative; however, given the entrance requirements of projects, it is safe to assume that the findings would tend to be, if anything, more conservative than a study among non-project slum dwellers. We may check this by comparing the statistical portrait to that which we discussed in the first chapter for the slum as a whole. The families of the sample have a higher
income, lower per centage non-white, and higher per centage complete families; this suggests a more conservative conclusion.

The focus of the study, carried out by David Caplovitz, a Columbia sociologist, is major durable goods (e.g., appliances and furniture). This may appear surprising as it is not commonly thought that consumers in low income areas would be able to afford these items. What Caplovitz was quick to find was that indeed, low income families were, like those of higher incomes, consumers of major durable goods. The reason for this he postulates is cultural pressures: "the popular image of the American striving for the material possessions which bestow upon him both comfort and prestige in the eyes of his fellows does not hold the ever-increasing middle class only." (1963:12) In fact, such consumption, Caplovitz suggests, may take on special significance among the poor. He refers to a concept of Kerton's, compensatory consumption, which expresses the idea that as social mobility and acceptance is blocked, the aspirations of the poor turn to the consumption sphere. "Since many have small prospects of greatly improving their low social standing through occupational mobility, they are apt to turn to consumption as at least one sphere in which they can make some progress toward the American dream of success." (1963:13) The dilemma of the low income consumer lies in the fact that he is trained by society to want the "symbols and appurtenances of the 'good life,'" at the same time as he lacks the means needed to fulfill these socially induced wants. Without the necessary cash and without the requisites of good credit standing, with little consumer knowledge and socially supported want for major durable goods, the slum dweller falls prey to an economy the outstanding feature of which is credit.
The economy of the slums is distinguished by the special adaptations of credit that merchants employ. To operate in this area, a merchant must offer credit despite the risks involved in doing so. Thus, a study properly concerns both the merchants' ways of merchandising and the consumers' patterns of consumption. We shall discuss both of these aspects of the slum economy to arrive at some estimation of the exploitative character of the low income economy.

The central position of credit in the economy was demonstrated by a survey of fourteen businesses in East Harlem by two Columbia Business School students, which showed that twelve of the store owners claimed that from 75% to 90% of their business was on credit, while the other two said that credit was around half of their business. (in Caplovitz, 1963:16) Clearly credit implies high risk in these areas. It would seem likely that the problem could be solved by charging high rates of interest, but New York has laws which restrict the cost of credit and require the use of installment contracts. This of course does not make the use of installment contracts universal, though Caplovitz found that most merchants claimed to use them.

Rather, the merchants have other ways of cutting risks. There is no law on the amount an item may be marked up. Representative of this is the system of pricing by "number" which is illustrated by Caplovitz:

We first heard of the 'number' system from a woman who had been employed as a bookkeeper in such a store. She illustrated a "one number" item by writing down a hypothetical wholesale price and then adding the same figure to it, a 100% markup. Her frequent references to "two number" and "three number" prices indicated that prices are never less than "one number" and are often more.

(1963:17)

Combined with markups, Caplovitz found that the merchandise was seldom of high quality. The answer given was that the markup on high
quality merchandise would be prohibitive; anything less would not be commensurate with the risk. "Thus, high markup on low quality goods is a major device used by the merchants to protect themselves against the risks of their credit business...This results in the irony that the people who can least afford the goods they buy are required to pay high prices relative to quality, thus receiving a comparatively low return for their consumer dollar." (1963:19) In large part, these merchants have a 'captive' market because their consumers do not meet the economic requirements of consumers in the larger, bureaucratic market.

There are a number of formal legal controls which are open to the merchant who uses the installment contract, among which are liens against property and wages, repossession, discounting paper (selling contracts to collection agencies), and credit association ratings. The primary risk of these controls however, for the merchant, is that he may lose the good-will in the neighborhood, which is all-important to his business.

Instead, Caplovitz found that merchants extend "flexible" credit, expecting their customers to miss some payments, adjusting the markup to this, and exerting informal controls to insure eventual payment. A system of weekly payments is usual for the amount is small, the merchant is able to get to know the customer, anticipate missed payments, sell more items, get to know his friends, and eventually exert pressure through them if the customer proves delinquent.

Characteristic of the personal and traditional quality of the economy is the customer peddler, the door-to-door salesman. The peddler may work for a store, bringing the customer in, or he may work for himself, buying merchandise wholesale and selling it door-to-door at a considerable markup.
The peddlars add considerably to the store cost, up to 30-50% more on the cost of appliances, for example.

The other aspect of the slum economy is the consumer patterns, to which we now turn our attention. Investigating the buying patterns of these families, Caplovitz found that most families were consumers of new as opposed to used major durable goods. The purchases of furniture reflect the fact that most of the sample were recent residents of the projects and had a greater need for furniture than the average. But automobile ownership and appliances are not necessarily linked to residence in public housing and are representative of low income housing as a whole; even here we find this conclusion substantiated.

There are two things to note about the shopping patterns of the poor. We have already made mention of the limited scope of shopping. Jahoda, Lazarsfield, and Zeisel, in their classic study of Marienthal, comment on what they call the restricted "life-space" that characterizes lower-class people:

The poor consumer is less psychologically mobile, less active, more inhibited in his behavior than the well-to-do consumer. The radius of stores he considers for possible purchases is always smaller. The poor people more often buy at the same store....

(1963:49)

Caplovitz's study tends to confirm this as well. What the families do not buy at an independent neighborhood store or from a peddler, they tend to buy from a chain store, generally located in the area, rather from a discount store, to be found downtown.

The preference for chain stores over discount stores is in direct contradiction to the 'middle class' consumer who prefers the opposite. The reason for this is that the low income consumer can get credit from
the chain store whereas, until recently, discount stores did not offer credit; even now, their standards are too high for the slum consumer.

The other aspect of shopping patterns is the central importance of the peddler. The peddler is the figure which most clearly exploits the traditional character of his customers. Some peddlars rely on personal rather than legal controls, becoming friends with the family, operating outside the law with their flexible credit. The other kind is the company representative, selling encyclopedias, pots and pans, and vacuum cleaners. Experts in high pressure selling, they use installment contracts and depend on finance agencies to collect. Yet despite their exploitative character, half of the 464 families interviewed by Caplovitz reported buying from peddlars in the last few years. (1963:59) Further, although he found that the lowest income groups tended to trade somewhat more frequently with peddlars, such trading was area-wide and not restricted to these poorest. (1963:70)

Focusing on three appliances (for which the largest number of cost estimates were available), the Caplovitz study found that the prices that families reported paying for these items were generally quite high, in some cases, almost unbelievably so. To get some notion of how high prices are, we may examine the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>APPLIANCE</th>
<th>DISCOUNT HOUSE</th>
<th>DEPARTMENT STORE</th>
<th>CHAIN STORE</th>
<th>TRADE NEIGHBOURS</th>
<th>PEDDLAR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TELEVISION</td>
<td>$11</td>
<td>$22</td>
<td>$31</td>
<td>$53</td>
<td>$67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCT. HIGHEST PRICE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PANDOLEARNER</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCT. OVER $1200</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WASHING MACHINE</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCT. OVER $230</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCT. OVER $300</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From Caplovitz, 1963, Table 64 (p.85)
The general pattern is clear. The few families shopping at the discount and department stores paid considerably lower prices for their items than the majority did at neighborhood and peddler sources.

Not only are area prices higher, sometimes much higher, than outside prices, but relevant to our considerations, the poorer families within the area tended to pay more for the same item. (1963:84) It is probably due to the more restricted life scope of these families, who venture out of the slum as consumers even less than their somewhat less poor neighbors.

A further element of exploitative prices is the finding that "for each appliance, the proportion paying a higher price is considerably smaller among the minority who pay cash." (1963:87) Considering that credit is the mainstay of the slum economy, it is obvious that the poor consumer is paying more for inferior quality merchandise because, in large part, of the particular form of marketing, the system of credit.

When dealing with the marginal families, the families of most limited assets (generally welfare cases), Caplovitz finds them to be the most insolvent and points to a vicious circle of debt:

To shop where prices are high and quality of products often poor and to pay the costs of credit are good ways of exhausting limited resources. Conversely, families parenially close to the limits of their resources and still wanting what they consider the necessities of life have fewer alternatives for shopping realistically open to them. Breaking this vicious circle would require that these consumers be re-educated and provided with less costly alternatives to their current practices. (Caplovitz, 1963:117)

Thus, both merchandising practices--the adaptations of credit--and consumer patterns indicate widespread exploitation in the system. The Caplovitz study documents numerous incidents of high pressure sales techniques, misrepresentation of prices, substitution of inferior goods for
ones ordered, etc. We must be careful to distinguish these, which are not
directly structural exploitation, from the exploitation that character-
izes the system itself, which assumes the form it does to exploit the
socially induced wants of the slum consumer by catering to his particular
credit needs and to his traditional background. (It is the distinction
between the system being exploited by "unscrupulous" merchants and the
system exploiting the consumer. We emphasize the latter.)

However, these deviations are useful in so far as they point to
the ways in which the economy becomes a sort of "company store." The
incidents touch on a number of themes:

"The role of mass media in setting off the chain of events with
alluring ads, the anonymity of many of the credit transactions
to the point where the consumer is not sure who the merchant
is, the bewilderment of the consumer in the face of powerful
forces brought into play by the merchant, and the hopelessness,
frustration, and resignation of many in the face of exploitation.
(1963:141)

The marketing system is in many respects a deviant one, in which
unethical and illegal procedures abound. Nevertheless, it can persist
because it fulfills social functions that are presently not fulfilled by
more legitimate institutions. The system's "paramount function" is to
allow those who fail to meet the requirements of the impersonal, bureau-
cratic economy to become consumers of major durable goods. Families with
almost no claim to credit-- the welfare family, for example-- are never-
theless able to buy in this market. A close association probably exists
between the amount of risk that merchants are willing to assume in this
system and their readiness to employ unethical and illegal tactics. "Society
now virtually presents the very poor risks with twin options of foregoing
major purchases or of being exploited." (Caplovitz, 1963:180)

With respect to the first option, we can recall our remarks above.
Consumption plays a very central role in our society—it is more than material convenience; rather, it has social imperatives. "Americans in all walks of life are trained to consume in order to win the respect of others and to maintain their self-respect." (Caplovitz, 1963:181) Moreover, with the poorest, there exist few opportunities on which to base their self-respect and respect granted by others on occupational, educational, or other accomplishments. This "poverty of opportunity" only reinforces that pattern that Kerton calls "compensatory consumption."

Exploitation in the slum housing market.

We have already discussed a profile of slum housing as crowded, neglected, deteriorated, and often obsolete. (Clinard, 1966:4) The United States' total of slum housing units in 1960 was 3,684,000 (of which just under a third were "dilapidated"). (Clinard, 1966:5) Not only does slum housing tend to be "substandard," but it is also generally the oldest in the city. A survey in Harlem showed that a full 90% of the residential buildings were tenements and brownstones built before 1929. (HARYOU, 1964:101) The relation of age to condition in the slum is shown by the conclusion to that survey: "as a residential community, then, Central Harlem on the whole provides unsafe, deteriorating, and overcrowded housing." (1964:107)

"Substandard" has a functional and judgmental sense when used in speaking of blight. Jerome Rothenberg, in a paper, "An Economic Evaluation of Urban Renewal Programs," uses it in this manner to give another perspective of the slum. Here, blight and slum refer to dwellings which are not "decent, safe, and sanitary." "Blight refers to a process and can refer to one or more structures, whether residential or not. Slum refers to a cluster of structures, usually residential, in an advanced stage of
blight." (1963:298, n. 2) They are likely to be dilapidated, overcrowded, filthy, vermin-infested fire traps. (1963:298)

We may delineate then a slum on the basis of housing, using either the architectural sense or the quality sense of substandard. The Tauber study of selected cities in all regions of the United States is an example of the success we can meet here; it gives us a fair indication of the kind of housing we are dealing with when we speak of the slum housing market. (Taubers, 1965) But we must examine the housing market as we did the consumer-business system, focusing both on the rentee's position and the landlord's position and looking for structurally generated exploitation.

Aside from the minimal quality of slum housing, housing exploitation is reflected by the rentee in at least two ways, in the high rents that he is forced to pay and in the high per centage of his total income that he must outlay for rent. The Civil Disorders Commission Report documents the higher rents that Negroes in slum areas must pay as compared to whites on the outside: "Negroes...are often forced to pay the same rents as whites and receive less for their money, or pay higher rents for the same accommodations." (1968:470) The report of course is concerned primarily with the plight of the Negro slum dweller, but there is other evidence which suggests that the paying of higher rents is a phenomena of all slum dwellers. The Glazer collection of studies (1955) and Hunter's study (1964) support this.

It is a paradoxical situation which leads to this. The poor are forced into the least desirable areas of the city in search of, among other things, cheap housing. Discrimination keeps them from moving out into other parts of the city as the slum becomes overcrowded; further, as we shall see, the landlords depend on overcrowding to turn a profit and so
any out-movement. The effect of the overcrowding is to increase the
demand for housing within the slum. With increased demand, the landlord
can charge higher rents. St. Clair Drake's study of the Negro ghettos
in Chicago in the forties supports this argument. (1962)

Not only are rents absolutely higher, but the slum dweller is
forced to spend as a result a greater proportion of his income on housing
costs than higher income groups. In 1956, Alvin Schorr reports that the
great majority of families with incomes under $2000 spent 30% or more of
their incomes on rent. This is to be compared with less than 15% of income
spent on rent by the majority of families with incomes of $8000-$10,000.
(Schorr, 1963, chapter four) If one can argue that annual income is not
always a reliable indication of a family's financial circumstances, a com-
parison of housing costs to total spending yields the same results. In
1950, urban families with incomes under $1000 a year spent 26% of total
outlay for housing; families from $1000-$2000, 22%; from $2000-$3000, 18%,
etc. (Schorr, 1963:216) An implication of this statistic is clear—in order
to pay for shelter, the poorest have to settle for inadequate food and
clothing, as more of their income must be diverted for rent.

From the point of view of the landlord, the system has been described
by Rothenberg, in has economic evaluation of urban renewal, in terms of
a model of a "filtering down" process. This same model is mentioned in
the Civil Disorders Report. (1968:473) Slum dwellings are low cost housing;
the average dwelling unit per household is also of low quantity because
of overcrowding. Rothenberg points out that given "the technical character
of the commodity which supplies housing services, so long as there exists
poor families, the existence of a significant supply of low-quality, low-
quantity housing units might represent an optimal use of resources in
this market." (Rothenberg, 1963:298) The existence of poverty makes a demand for low quality housing reasonable. Given a necessary expenditure for housing and given a large number of poor families, it is a function of the slum to provide these families with a place where they can afford to live.

The accommodation which most American cities makes, Rothenberg suggests, for this need is the "filtering system" in which the slum has a functional role. "The durability of housing makes it most efficient to meet the demand for such housing, not through new construction, but by means of a filtering downward of existing housing stock through aging, structural conversion to permit occupation of smaller units, and depreciation of maintenance." (1963:298) Housing construction is generally at higher income levels. As these families leave their old dwellings for new, better ones, the lower income groups move into these former dwellings. The slum then is the last stage of the filtering process, the stage just above demolition or abandonment of the structure, the stage of lowest quality and highest density. Rothenberg states: "...a stock of old, worn housing, cut up into smaller units in the process of downward conversion, is the market's efficient way of providing housing service for the poor." (1963:299)

Besides its role in the total housing stock system, there is another economic function of the slum, the production of profit. This is at the level of the individual landlord, whereas the slum's function in the filtering process is on the level of all landlords.

The production of profit in slum housing is a complex matter. As Rothenberg argues, "the profitability of slums is not inevitable nor does it rest on market forces that are ethically neutral." (1963:301) He distinguishes between two types of slum production, intensive and extensive.
Intensive production is the conversion of housing stock to lower and lower use, and lower and lower quality level. Extensive production is extending the spatial limits of the slums. The two important types of intensive production are converting dwellings to increased overcrowded capacity and allowing the state of property to deteriorate progressively. Rothenberg describes profitability in slum reproduction:

There is a large, uninformed, highly elastic demand for low quality housing in concentrated areas. Expansion of quantity comes most profitably from conversion to overcrowding. Moreover, the higher cost of accelerated depreciation is not made up in rentals, but in the less noticeable way of neglecting to keep the property up to legally required standards. Thus, conversion to slum use often increases revenues without increasing costs, and even sometimes decreases actual expenses. (1963:302)

The dilemma of overcrowding is described by Drake:

Midwest Metropolis doesn't want to let Negroes stay where they are, and it doesn't want to scatter them freely about the city. It doesn't want to rebuild the inner city to house them, nor does it wish to find houses elsewhere for them. And all the time Black Metropolis—a big, stubborn, eight-mile tract crammed with over 300,000 people—grows more and more congested. (1962:208)

It is relevant to note that the slum in this sense has not only a function but a manifest function in the system of profitmaking. That is, the consequences are both "intended and recognized by participants in this system." (Merton, 1957:51) This is despite the fact that such practices by the landlords are not normally approved methods.

The relation of these constrictions on expansion of the slum to rent and profit is also discussed by Drake:

During the last twenty years, the Negro's demand for housing has always exceeded the supply. The rental value of residential property in the Black Belt is thus abnormally high. The speculative value of the land on which the property stands is also high, and even more than
the restriction of supply, this has a tendency to drive rents up. A prominent real estate operator, during the Depression, said frankly to a Negro social worker: 'There are two ways to handle residential property in the Black Belt. Figure on amortizing your investment in twenty years and scale the rent accordingly. Plan to amortize your investment in ten years and double the rent. If this section is doomed for residential purposes anyhow, the latter is a better business practice for us.' Houses in Black metropolis pay off now. The land they occupy will do so in the future. (1962:207)

One of the reasons that profitmaking in slum comes from minimum maintenance and maximum overcrowding is the tax law structure. The municipal property tax, the capital gains tax, the basis for computing value in condemnation, and the depreciation allowance—all are so structured as to reward the worst housing. Their effect is to maintain the slum by encouraging the continual exploitation of the slum rentee.

The property tax, for example, increases with property improvements, so there is little incentive to keep up maintenance, particularly if the landlord does not live in the building and he is assured of a constant demand for his rental space.

Schorr describes the similar effect of the capital gains tax. "If the owner's bracket is high, his interest centers on ultimate resale value. Though resale value in other property may depend on maintenance, in low-income neighborhoods it is likely to depend on the value of the land and on the net income that is being produced. Thus, the profit lies in holding on while the land becomes valuable and secondarily in current income." (1963:213) There is little cash benefit for money spent on maintenance and repair of facilities.

Federal depreciation laws treat real-estate as machinery and equipment. Thus, the owner may write off a high depreciation in early years
of ownership and a smaller write-off in later years. Upon resale, depreciation write-off may start all over again, so there is much incentive to keep property for several years, sell and buy other property. Again, depreciation tax laws offer no profit for improvements on property. It forces the landlord to seek maximum short-range profit, which he can only do with high rents, low maintenance, and overcrowding. The process is cyclical: "as buildings are subdivided, crowded, and more deteriorated, they become well-nigh impossible to maintain. Moreover, it becomes impractical to try to maintain neighboring houses."

(Schorr, 1963:215)

The question of maintenance has been answered by pointing to the code enforcement regulations in many cities. However, numerous articles on code enforcement give much reason to doubt the effectiveness of these building codes in promoting a minimum standard of decent housing. Either the codes do not provide for an acceptable standard of housing or they are simply not enforced: "widespread failure to attempt to enforce housing codes is one of the reasons that so much housing is now sub-standard."

(Schorr, 1963:211)

Schorr sees this as a superficial symptom of a deeper maladjustment; his conclusion agrees considerably with that which emerges from our discussion of profitability in slum housing. "The hard fact is that profit-making incentives run counter--so far as maintenance of housing is concerned--to the best interests of the poor. Tax laws and condemnation procedures combine with the peculiarly vulnerable situation of those who are poor to pay the most profit for the worst housing." (1963:214)

The question that arises is whether within the present structure of the slum housing market there can be any improvements in directions such as less congestion, lower rents, and more capital improvements
and maintenance of slum housing. Most authorities argue to the negative, that given the present institutions and filtering system, exploitation of the poor rentee is going to continue in some inevitable fashion. The Civil Disorders Commission report holds that fundamental changes in this system are necessary to alleviate the situation. The control by the private sector, that is, the capitalist system, of housing is going to have to be replaced by an entirely new and centrally planned, joint effort.

There is no lack of evidence as to widespread dissatisfaction of slum dwellers over housing. Again, the Commission reports,

'The result has been widespread discontent with housing conditions and costs. In nearly every disorder city surveyed, grievances related to housing were important factors in the structure of Negro discontent.'

(1968:472-3)

Unemployment and underemployment in the slum.

Unemployment can present a baffling problem in terms of the variety of forms it can assume and the various social contexts in which it appears. What we are focusing on here is the relationship of unemployment to the slum dweller, the ways in which the economy is structured to exploit the slum dweller as he approaches the labor market.

There are several categories of unemployment; many economists break it into three types. The first is "demand shortage" unemployment, which occurs when total expenditures in the economy—total demand for goods and services—is inadequate to generate a sufficient number of jobs. The solution to this is of course a vigorous policy, e.g., tax reduction, to raise total demand. The second kind of unemployment arises from the nature of our dynamic and expanding economy. That is, frictional unemployment is that unemployment which results from temporary mismatching of skills.
and jobs, men and requirements. (Weisbrod, 1965:135) The third type is that which results when pockets of such frictional unemployment become larger and assume some permanence. In this case, unemployment is known as "structural unemployment." This third type is at the root of our problem.

"High specific unemployment rates, which persist even when the general rate falls to an acceptable level, are the essence of the problem of structural unemployment." (Weisbrod, 1965:73) We see that our particular kind of unemployment, so-called "hard-core" unemployment, located in pockets such as the urban slum, exists almost independently of the overall rate. While this simplifies our investigation in a sense, it also points to one of the real problems of hard-core unemployment--to a large extent, it cannot respond to any general prosperity in the economy. It has its own dynamic, which, however sensitive to the long-range trends of the economy, are largely independent of short-run fluctuations.

What does a profile of the hard-core unemployment look like? Chronic unemployment in urban slums is highest among the youth and the men over forty-five. HARYOU reports that up to 50% of the teenagers who have been looking for employment for at least a year are unemployed. The rate can get as high for the older workers as well. (Levitan, in Weisbrod, 1965:115) Unemployment hits those who are the least educated and who have the fewest skills to bring to the labor market. Statistics often underestimate the problem, particularly when trying to measure unemployment in the slums, for statistics are based only on those who are actively seeking work. They do not count the "invisible army of unemployed," those who have left the labor market, who have stopped looking for jobs. If these were counted, the national rate is estimated by some (Levitan, in Weisbrod, 1965:120) to rise to 8.8%; the rate in hard-core pockets could rise to sometimes
over 50%.

The structural nature of this unemployment has been pointed to by
Gunnar Myrdal, who speaks of "...the discrepancy between the direction
of labor demand and the quality of labor supply which gives the present
unemployment its structural character." (in Weisbrod, 1965:172) The prob-
lem may be simply stated as one of a declining labor demand in the catego-
ries to which the slum dweller is qualified, in the face of a constant
labor supply. There is a declining number of unskilled jobs, the educational
requirements for even semi-skilled jobs is rising, and the slum dweller,
bringing little skill to the labor market, is in danger of being phased
out of the market.

Although the absolute level of education in the slums is rising
with every generation, this is no assurance that the younger generation
will find employment. Miller and Rien point out that "education today
does not seem to be effectively reducing the occupational and income
inequality in society, at least for youth coming from low-income fami-
lies." (in Ferman et al, 1965:500) The long term neglect of the slum
schools is only slowly beginning to be rectified. The educational level
for jobs which provide decent income and security is constantly moving
upward. As low-income youth increase their absolute level of education,
the educational achievement of the rest of the population also continues
to rise. The best that can be hoped for is that the low-income youth will
maintain the same relative position. But Miller and Rein note that even
maintaining the same relative position may in time represent a decline
in opportunity as the overall volume of jobs declines in relation to a
growing labor force and as educational credentials for jobs rise. "The
use of an absolute educational standard such as the high school diploma
as a national goal can be deceptive because the meaning of this standard changes over time. Increasingly high school graduation will be inadequate in gaining a foothold in the American occupational structure. An underlying assumption is that if we bring people to a certain level of education, there will continue to be jobs for them. Despite expanded production, there simply may not be enough jobs to cover the rapidly expanding labor force." (in Ferman et al, 1965:500)

Not only is structural unemployment in the sums enforced by a growing labor supply, but it is also affected by a shift in labor demand, a proportional decline in the number of jobs at the less skilled end of the job market. The cause here has been to a large extent automation.

Much discussion has been generated concerning whether automation creates or destroys jobs. Economists are coming to realize that both positions are correct; what is important is where it is destroying jobs and at what level it is creating jobs. Professor Charles Killingsworth, in testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Employment and Manpower, summarizes this new approach to automation: "The fundamental effect of automation on the labor market is to 'twist' the pattern of demand— that is, it pushes down the demand for workers with little training while pushing up the demand for workers with large amounts of training." (in Ferman, 1965:146) Automation then is destroying jobs at the lowest levels of the job market while creating jobs at the most skilled levels. Killingsworth concludes that automation has created a situation in which "...unemployment at the bottom of the educational scale was relatively unresponsive to general increases in the demand for labor...." (in Ferman, 1965:151)
Besides the structural aspects of unemployment, there exists another problems of equally serious dimensions, the problem of underemployment. The effect of underemployment, or subemployment, as it is often referred to, is to compound the impact of unemployment on the slum. A survey of slum areas in nine large American cities revealed that the unemployment rate in these areas in 1966 was 9.3% But when one considers the number of underemployed, that is, those part-time workers looking for full-time employment and those full-time employees earning under $3000 per year, the figure for both rises to 32.7% or 8.8 times the overall unemployment rate of all United States workers. The Civil Disorders Commission calculates that, "in order to bring subemployment in these areas (of the inner city) down to a level equal of unemployment alone among whites, enough steady, reasonably-paying jobs (and the training and motivation to perform them) must be provided to eliminate all underemployment and reduce unemployment by 65%." (1968:257) In 1967, this deficit amounted to 923,000 jobs.

The combination of structural, hard-core unemployment and extensive underemployment is evidence that the slum dweller in the labor market, trying to secure and/or maintain a "steady, reasonably paying job," is faced with a declining chance of finding such employment in an economy that is otherwise expanding. The economy, while "healthy" for the great majority of Americans in its middle and top sections, is contracting at the bottom.

Michael Harrington speaks of a new poverty brought on by the growing obsolescence of the "new poor": "in contrast to the old poverty of immigrants who came with high hopes to a new land and an expanding economy and found unskilled or semi-skilled factory jobs, the new poor
are aliens in this affluent country. They are rejects of the past." This is a new kind of poverty in a new kind of society. This is the first "poverty of automation," the first poverty of the "minority poor," and a poverty that:

under present conditions could become hereditary, transmitted from generation to generation unless the typical cycles of poverty are broken.

(Harrington, in Ferman, 1965:vii)
Chapter Four

The Case for a Marxian Model

We began this paper by sketching out the various characteristics of the slum of the American city today. Among these were substandard housing, juvenile delinquency, unemployment, underemployment, infrequent business participation, etc. As sociologists, our task is to explain social behavior, to construct models by which we may analyze this behavior. The slum as a construct cannot be simply the sum of these descriptive characteristics; to give it an analytic utility, we examine these characteristics to determine if they can yield any theoretical perspective for our chosen area of social behavior, the slum. (re: n.7, p.66)

There have been a number of sociologists who have attempted to do this— to put the slum in some analytic framework; among them are Park, Burgess, and Warner. They have given us the ecological model and the stratification model, both of which developed out of the Parsonian orientation. That is, an implicit assumption of these sociologists is that society is a functionally integrated system, held in equilibrium. Change proceeds from a consensus of values rather than a conflict of interests.

The imperative for this paper comes from the suggestion that there is another way of conceptualizing society, an orientation based on the idea of conflict; this view sees society as held together by con-
straint, in continuous change, and finding the seeds of change in the structure of society itself. Assuming this perspective, we are led to ask if some of these characteristics of the slum do not reflect a structure in conflict. Do high unemployment, substandard housing, and high consumer prices, when examined by sociologists, reveal forces in conflict? If there is exploitation, does this fact allow us to move from the common sense notion of the slum as the urban area of a certain description to some analytical sense of the 'slum'?

We hypothesize that we can give the slum analytical meaning through the introduction of the concept of class. To this end, we have discussed the two major models which relate to class that are available to the sociologist. It is our purpose in this chapter to assess the utility of the models in explaining the structural exploitation of the three situations of chapter three. Is "class" a useful analytic tool in speaking of the slum dweller?

We have seen that class conflict for Marx "entails the dominant issues of conflict in society." Marx's classes are founded on economic relations, on the "relations of production"--"the distribution of effective property." The class one is in is determined by his position in the economic matrix. But classes only become socially significant in the political sphere.

This last qualification leads Marx to a two stage model of the formation of classes. In the first step, the distribution of effective property creates two "common situations," based on possession and exclusion. A common situation is a common relation to effective property,
common socio-economic situation, and a common tendency to "actual behavior determined by objective interests."

A common situation is not sufficient though; classes as such do not constitute themselves until they participate in political conflicts as organized groups. This operates on two levels. On the factual level, it implies an association of people, a party. On the ideological level, it implies the development of class consciousness.

Dahrendorf notes a number of structural changes in industrial society over the past century and argues that these changes have necessitated a re-evaluation of the basis of class. He shifts the focus of his definition of class from the economic aspects to class as determined by authority relations in general. He feels that class conflict now arises out of disputes over the distribution of authority in given authority structures. He maintains much of the Marxian framework; the crucial quality of structural relations is the domination/subjection dichotomy. Classes form when this relationship is internalized, and when it becomes the basis for action. The common situation is represented by quasi-groups in which interest is latent; as class consciousness develops, conflict groups of manifest interests emerge. (Lopreato, 1967:282)

From these models we moved to a discussion of the situations of the exploitation of the slum dweller. The consumer pays more for poorer quality because of a "company-store" like system of credit which capitalizes on the traditional background and ignorance of the slum dweller. The necessity for profit forces the merchants to exorbitant mark-ups, high pressure selling, and expensive credit arrangements.

The structure of the housing market, which favors construction on
a high income level and the filtering-down system to meet the demands of the poorest for housing, and the profit motive both force on the slum-dweller housing of minimum maintenance and maximum over-crowding. Tax laws only reinforce this structure.

The decreasing demand for unskilled and semi-skilled labor in an economy which is expanding at the same time as it can employ fewer and fewer of the lowest stratum of workers creates a hard-core unemployment problem which we have seen is localized, in urban areas, in the slum. Even education is of skeptical benefit as the economy, given the strides of automation, is expanding at the top and middle and contracting at the bottom. Underemployment only adds to the problem as these are men that the economy hires last and fires first; as marginal members, they are gradually being dropped from the labor force. Finally, the profit motive does not favor any re-training programs because the supply of labor for the lowest stratum of jobs is already adequate to meet the demands.

All three of these structures exploit the slum dweller in his economic relationships with the outside market economy. Each of the situations create two "common situations"—businessman and consumer, landlord and rentee, employer and unemployed. The relationship is one of power/impotence; we may derive this from the exploitation. Finally, there is a convergence of the common situations.; that is, the same set of individuals are being exploited--the slum dwellers.

The significant exploitation of the slum dweller appears to be in his economic relations to the outside society, and for this reason the Marxian model is more useful for an analysis than Dahrendorf's
model. We noted the fundamental similarities of the models: both emphasize the domination/subjection relationship, posit a two-stage formation in which classes arise when latent interests become manifest, and stress the need for political action as an expression of class consciousness, the act of defending or attacking the status quo power arrangements. The crucial difference is with the basis of class. A Marxian class is based on the economic relations that derive from the relations of production, the exclusion from or possession of effective private property; in Dahrendorf's model, a class derives from the relations of authority, the possession of or exclusion from authority.

Dahrendorf's analysis of changes in industrial society seems sound, although it is not our place to assess them in detail. But his suggestion that these changes should lead to a shift from stressing the economic relations to using all relations of authority as a basis of class formation is a statement which, while perhaps applicable to the society in general, must be tested empirically for each particular situation. What this paper has proposed is that when we are examining the situation of the slum dweller, the critical relations of exploitation revolve around rentee-landlord, consumer-businessman, and employer-worker. However such changes as increased mobility, institutionalization of conflict, the development of a "middle class," have affected class relations in other parts of the society, the slum remains unaffected. There is little mobility, few institutionalized channels for bargaining, and certainly no "middle class"; the slum dweller remains in a relation to his economic "masters" which our evidence suggests, borders on absolute domination/subjection. The exploitation of the slum dweller we have found to be
structural— the economy is structured so as to enforce this power/impotence relationship— and it is primarily economic. The Marxian model appears to be more appropriate for our area of investigation.

The objection might be raised that the only economic relation that Marx was dealing with was the employer-employee relationship and that those we have considered— consumer-businessman, rentee-landlord, and employer-employee— are not strictly economic in a Marxian sense. This however is to misunderstand Marx. It is true that Marx's work considered primarily this relationship of employer-employee. Das Capital is an example of this. There are two reasons for this though.

Das Capital is primarily a study of working conditions in England in the late nineteenth century and a historical perspective of those conditions; at that time, the most important economic relation was that of employer to employee. It was this example that Marx used to develop his model, which then assumed more general proportions. Also, the employer-employee relation was stressed because of its unique position in Marx's philosophy of history, not in his sociological model. The worker's special position is in Marx's analysis of England and in his schema of history, but not in his sociological model. We have been very careful in the second chapter to make this distinction clear, and it is important to maintain it here. Our interest is not in the first two but in the latter.

The economic model of class is founded on the "relations of production" as they relate to the "distribution of effective property." It is a possession of economic power/exclusion from economic power (property) model and as such is more general than just the employer-employee relation. The objection is thus invalid.
But it is not enough to demonstrate that the exploitation is structural and economic and results in a relationship of economic domination/subjection. The Marxian model is primarily a model of class formation and conflict, which depends on this relationship being both perceived (class consciousness) and contested (or defended). The objective property differential must be realized and internalized (made manifest), and it must become the basis for action, conflict.

So we must move further in our analysis. The utility of the Marxian model for our area of social behavior, the slum, depends not only on whether we can document a structure of domination/subjection relationships but also on whether we can demonstrate behavior for which the Marxian notion of class formation are applicable as a tool of analysis.

That is, we use the Marxian model to understand the business, housing, and employment problems in terms of structural conflict, possession/exclusion, and economic basis of conflict. But the Marxian model also allows us to speak of the formation of classes as political actors through the development of class consciousness that results from the articulation of latent interests. If we can demonstrate that there are situations for which this part of the model is appropriate, we have made our case that much more convincing.

There are in fact at least two examples which may be analyzed in terms of the Marxian model: the work of Saul Alinsky and the Industrial Areas Foundation and the Poor Peoples' March on Washington, organized by the late Dr. Martin Luther King.

Saul Alinsky is a professional organizer whose goal is to help
slum leaders "create a disciplined, broad-based power organization capable of wringing concessions-- better jobs, better schools, better garbage collection, better housing-- from the local Establishment." (Anderson, 1966:28) As director of the Industrial Areas Foundation, he travels to various cities, at the invitation of local leaders, and assists them in developing "popular participation and militant organization." He sees his role as a "technician," not a leader; he offers his skills in catalyzing that which is already present but latent: "The community organizer digs into a morass of resignation, hopelessness, and despair and works with the local people in articulating (or "rubbing raw") their resentments. In telling them over and over again, 'You don't have to take this and you can do something about it,' he becomes a catalytic agent translating hidden resentments and hostilities into open problems." His job is to persuade people to move-- to be active, to participate, in short to develop and harness the power necessary to change the prevailing pattern. "When those prominent in the status quo turn and label you an agitator, they are completely correct for that is, in one word, your function-- to agitate to the point of conflict." (Alinsky, in Silberman, 1964:334–335)

Alinsky is quite frank about operating on the principle of 'change requires conflict.' "There is no evolution without revolution; there are no revolutions without conflict." He sees the resentments of the slum dwellers to be grounded in a structural impotency. Change cannot come from what he considers to be the 'Peace Corps mentality' of the poverty program, but from an organization of slum dwellers which challenges the power of the establishment. He asks for a rearrangement of the status quo power relations: "it is a misconception in assuming that the poor can even make
significant gains without fighting for them—advantage comes from power." (Alinsky, in Anderson, 1966:94)

Alinsky learned his theory from John Lewis, the organizer for the CIO in the thirties. "If labor's organizing techniques could be applied to entire slum communities, he believed, organized poor people might wrest a higher standard of living as a matter of right instead of waiting passively for the crumbs of charity." (Anderson, 1966:98)

Alinsky first began organizing in the barrios of California, the Mexican-American slums of southern California cities; from there he moved to Detroit, Kansas City, Chicago, New York, among others. Alinsky-trained organizers from the Foundation have spread out into scores of American cities, always at local invitation. An example of Alinsky's efforts is Rochester.

After large scale riots in Rochester in the summer of 1965, clergymen from around the city diagnosed "a lack of structure among the inner-city people that would give them a voice, cohesion, and a sense of identity." Alinsky was brought in for this purpose and succeeded in establishing an association of local organizations called FIGHT (freedom, integration, God, honor, today) which launched a continual harassment of school boards, City Hall, the city's poverty program, the police department, and the Eastman Kodak Company. The last received national attention when Alinsky claimed that the company had backed out of an agreement made by one of the vice presidents by which FIGHT would recruit 500 Negro youths, which Kodak would train for jobs at its plant in Rochester. The consequence of this was large scale direct action by FIGHT, a harassment which continues still.
But Alinsky's most famous organization drive was The Woodlawn Organization, TWO, in the Chicago slum of Woodlawn. The success that the organization has had in wrestling power and concessions from City Hall has been to a certain extent at the expense of the University of Chicago, whose campus borders the slum and whose administrators and some professors have bitterly fought the TWO challenge to the status quo:

Paul Hauser, head of the sociology department (which Alinsky has labelled "a tribe of head counters") has warned that any Negro who follows Alinsky down the path of social conflict"...may be the victim of a cruel, even, if unintended, hoax. The methods by which (Alinsky) organizes TWO may actually impede the achievement of consensus and thus delay the attainment of Woodlawn's objectives.

(Andersen, 1966:102)

The answer that Alinsky gives to this voice of the status quo is representative of his whole philosophy:

One thing that we instill in all our organizations is that old Spanish Civil War slogan, "It's better to die standing than live on your knees." Social scientists don't like to think in these terms. They would rather talk about politics being a matter of accommodation, consensus-- and not this conflict business. This is typical academic drivel. How do you have consensus before you have conflict? There has to be a rearrangement of power, and then you can have consensus.

(Andersen, 1966:102)

On April 29, 1968, a group of one hundred representatives of rural poor and slum dwellers will go to Washington to make a number of demands upon the legislators in Congress. This group is the vanguard for the Poor People's March on Washington, a massive assault on the nation's capital by thousands of rural and urban poor, which will begin assembling in representative cities in early May and then proceed by march, donkey cart, bus, and car to Washington, where an expected 30000 people will attempt to set up a temporary summer city on the public land surrounding the Capital Building, there to conduct classes, workshops, stores, and canteens. The 3000 will try to force Congress' hand through mere presence
and various pressures to enact an Economic Bill of Rights. "...They might tie up transportation in Washington, jam the hospitals, boycott schools, and just sit-in at Government offices in a 'last desperate demand to avoid the worst chaos, hatred, and violence any nation has ever encountered.'" (Yglesias, 1968:30)

The man behind the Poor Peoples' March was the late Martin Luther King. Since his assassination, the planning has been taken over by Dr. Ralph Abernathy, King's associate on the staff of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, which is sponsoring and coordinating the march.

Unlike the first march on Washington in 1963, this is not a civil rights demonstration; it is a demonstration of the poor to make blanket demands on Congress.

"Now the nature and content of the demonstrations has changed; they are not going to Washington as in 1963, to support proposed legislation; they are not speaking for blacks alone but for all poor people, and they will not be following a line of march benevolently set out for them and protected by a generally approving administration."

What the SCLC is trying to do is to organize a challenge to the economic status quo:

They are out to get an Economic Bill of Rights. The tactics are non-violent and the tone of the language in SCLC is moral, but the substance of the demands is revolutionary for American class demands dramatically expressed through other than the orderly democratic process.

(Yglesias, 1968:57)

King did not deny that change could only come through conflict and a challenge to the status quo. He anticipated on several occasions, and those now responsible for planning the march predict that change is likely to involve violence (though they do not sanction it). In King's words,
"our program calls for a redistribution of economic power."

This was supported by the Reverend James Bevel, one of the SCLC organizers of the march. Speaking at Amherst College, on April 21, 1968, he claimed that the structure of the economy was such that "it did not recognize the poor." It is an economy, he claimed, built on slavery and exploitation." The March is a dramatization by the poor for their demand for the reorganization of this economy.

Finally, King saw himself as Alinsky does, as an organizer who develops resentments that are latent in the poor, including the slum dweller:

We who engage in non-violent, direct action are not creators of tensions. We merely bring to the surface the hidden tension that is already alive. We bring it out into the open where it can be dealt with.

(Silberman, 1964:357)

Clearly, the Marxian model may be used to analyze the work of both these men. Both King and Alinsky focus on the economic domination/subjection relations and seek to develop a class consciousness from this objective situation, an awareness of the structure of exploitation by means of a strong organization which is committed to action, to conflict, as the means to change. The Marxian model gives a unique role to conflict—it becomes in a given structure, both the necessary and sufficient condition for change. (In the model, conflict will lead to a change in the status quo and change must come from conflict, not consensus). The model provides us with a way of analyzing the work of King and Alinsky and of relating this to the condition of objective structural exploitation of the slum dweller that we documented in chapter three. Conversely, the work of King and Alinsky as well as the evidence of exploitation in chapter three provide an empi-
rical test for the utility of the Marxian model.

It must be remembered that we do not, by this, claim that Alinsky is or King was a "Marxist." To say this would be to ignore our careful distinctions concerning the status of models. We hypothesize that the Marxian model of class has an analytic validity when applied to certain situations of the slum. To this end, we say not that Alinsky is a Marxist, but that his behavior may be analyzed as if it corresponds to a Marxian behavior, a Marxian articulation of exploitation. We return, in fact, to our statement in the introduction, that a model is a heuristic device, a metaphor, if you will, a tool of sociological analysis.

In making our case for a Marxian model, we have demonstrated its utility in analyzing two aspects of social behavior in the slum. The first group of data concerned the exploitative relationship of landlord-tenant, businessman-consumer, and employer-worker, for which we found it useful to employ the Marxian framework which saw this exploitation as structural, economic and expressing a domination/subjection tension. For our second group of data, the work of King and Alinsky, we used the Marxian notion of class formation, in which the common resentments arising from the above exploitative relationships were articulated in a consciousness of class and served as motivation behind a strong political organization, committed to a rearrangement of the status quo, committed to action, committed to conflict (as distinct from violence). This was the hypothesis we addressed ourselves to at the outset. We have been able to successfully come to terms with it in this chapter.

But to arrive at the point where we could deal with our original hypothesis, where we could demonstrate the utility of the Marxian model,
for giving some analytic meaning to the phenomenon of the slum, we had to consider several intermediate issues. We found that inadequacies of current literature on the slum to be bias towards consensus. Investigating Marx, we had to make the separation of a sociological model of structural conflict through classes from Marx's materialist philosophy of history. And we considered an alternative model of conflict, the Dahrendorf model, which considered recent changes in industrial society.

By way of concluding, we would consider there to be some value in our work if we have contributed in some small way to:

a. re-establishing the study of structural conflict, in particular toward an acceptance of the legitimacy of the sociology of Karl Marx;

b. and suggesting a new way of conceptualizing the slum—a alternate model.

Cardinal responsibilities of the sociologist to his academy are to preserve the spirit of free inquiry and to use his position as a student of society, to analyze social behavior. We can only hope that our work has contributed toward vindicating our responsibilities in these areas.
Afterword

There is a school of thought in sociology, a survival from the social reformers of American sociology's first generation, which holds that social scientists must address themselves to the "problems of today." The sociologist is urged to plunge into the most pressing social issues, actively planning and making policy.

It is not our place to pass on this question of the proper role of the sociologist, but there is one implication of our model that might be mentioned here. Our Marxian model emphasizes the conflict of interests between groups which arise because of their different relation to private property and the relations of production. Their relationship is based on a domination/subjection dichotomy. The resentment that we call class consciousness grows from the awareness of the possession of/ exclusion from nature of the situation.

The importance in our model of the arrangements of economic power would lead us to be skeptical of programs and policies that do not consider this resentment. A "war on poverty" that administers from the top may ultimately fail because, no matter what is given out as rewards, one motivation of the slum dweller is going to be for a re-arrangement of the power status quo; a "war on poverty" that draws its legitimation from its position of authority, its place in the status quo may be seriously jeopardizing its success.

Silberman speaks of "welfare capitalism" and Haryou speaks of "economic colonies." Our model would suggest that policies must consider that what the slum dweller is really asking for, their legislators may not be able to give them, without revolutionary consequences.
Footnotes


5. When speaking of authority, we are using Max Weber's distinction between power and authority. "...While power is merely a factual relation, authority is a legitimate relation of domination and subjection. In this sense, authority can be described as legitimate power." (Dahrendorf, 1959:165); cf. Weber, 1958:91-96.

6. We do not include Coser's work on conflict because it can be argued that, while he certainly addresses himself to "conflict" (1954; 1956), Coser's orientation is that of Parsons. Coser's assumption about conflict is that it is healthy, necessary, and functional in maintaining the equilibrium of society. It does not disrupt society, and in fact, it works on some vaguely defined dialectic with harmony in preserving structure. He does not find anything analytically unique in "class"; it is but one of the categories of an "in-group" and as such corresponds to the postulates that he establishes for all social groups. (1956) Conflict increases in-group cohesion, maintains the boundaries of society; it binds antagonists, preserves a common interest, and establishes and maintains a balance of power. In these ways, it contributes to the maintenance of equilibrium. Conflict for Coser functions in the consensus of society. (1954;1956:25-31)

7. We must distinguish here between the phenomenon of the slum and the exploitation of the slumdweller. Implicit in our argument is the contention that there are at least two levels of abstraction of the phenomenon of the slum, the descriptive and the analytic. One way of moving from the former to the latter is by constructing models.

As we stated in the introduction, we, the citizen, the reporter, may describe the slum as "things as they are." There are certain characteristics, observations we may make, about the slum; our statement at the beginning of the first chapter is in this category. As sociologist, in explaining social behavior, we are engaged in conceptualization. Our reality is analytic; it is qualitatively different from descriptive reality ("things as they are") because the criteria of validity are different. That is, there is not just one analysis that will "fit" a given area of facts. When we select an area of social behavior, the slum, for example, our analysis will depend on what elements we elect to isolate from this area and study. Various models are reflections of what in the given areas has been chosen for study.

We are arguing that a particular view of conflict has kept American sociologists from dealing adequately with some facets of that which we call a "slum"; in particular they have given us no framework for understanding exploitation. We will document structural exploita-
7. (continued) tion of the slum dweller and we will analyze this in terms of the Marxian model of class conflict—"as if this were" class conflict.

This is not, in a strict sense, a Marxian model of the slum; it is a model of some of the structural relations of the slum dweller. But beyond the level of description (where we can say the phenomenon of the slum is x number of characteristics), the phenomenon of the slum is an analytic phenomenon. Its sense depends on the model one is constructing. So the (analytic) phenomenon of the slum for us here is the structural relations of exploitation which we will document and conceptualize with the Marxian model. For the ecologist, the (analytic) phenomenon of the slum is the "natural area" of the city which bears a particular kind of relation to the central business district. As two different analyses of the same area of facts, they are complementary, not competitive.

8. cf. Schosinski, 1966, in which he reviews the various tenant-landlord legal relations and concludes that the law leaves the tenant little to fall back on. "The way to decent housing is blocked by the legal matrix."
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