Samurai Baseball: The Vicissitudes of a National Sporting Style

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The conventional view of Japan’s national pastime, baseball, is that it is a sport misshapen from an original exuberant American game by a Japanese national propensity to slavish loyalty and uncritical adherence to form. This substantially misrepresents the trajectory of baseball in Japan by substituting an illusory appeal to national character stereotypes for a serious historical sociology of sport. Abe and Mangan, among others, have already uncovered the complex influences of British athleticism and sportsmanship on early Japanese sport philosophies. This article depicts the subsequent history of Japanese baseball as a complex interplay of nationalized sporting style, educational pedagogy, urban entertainment, media creation, local identity and the realities of sports practices.

Because of its slow pace, baseball fits the Japanese character perfectly. The conservative play mirrors the Japanese conservative and deliberate approach to life. Managers and coaches view baseball as a tool to teach loyalty and moral discipline – the same type of loyalty and discipline feudal Japanese lords expected from their soldiers and subjects. This samurai discipline requires endless hours of training, self-denial, and an emphasis on spirituality. So goes the Japanese approach to baseball. [1]

Since 1995, when the baseball pitcher Hideo Nomo outsmarted the owner of the Japanese club that held his contract and jumped to the US major league Los Angeles Dodgers, increasing numbers of Japanese players have found places on Major League Baseball (MLB) club rosters. Now they usually come by official arrangements rather than by stealth, and a fair number of the two dozen or so who have played in recent seasons have been successful. A few, such as Ichiro and Hideki Matsui, have become well-recognized stars, although even for them, their previous accomplishments in Japan are largely unknown in the US, even to knowledgeable fans.

One exception is Daisuke Matsuzaka, who completed his second outstanding year of pitching for the Boston Red Sox in 2008 and for whom the Red Sox paid his
Japanese team just over $50 million just for the right to negotiate a contract that cost
the club another $52 million. As part of the media hoopla, baseball fans were made
well aware of his background in Japan, especially his astonishing exploits in leading
his high-school team to both the spring and summer national championships in
1998. In the latter tournament, played in the blazing and humid August heat, he
appeared in six games during an 11-day period, pitching 54 innings and throwing an
incredible 782 pitches. What the Japanese public saw as heroic effort, most American
fans saw as absolute folly. In short, Matsuzaka is another sporting samurai from that
other baseball nation where everything seems so topsy-turvy. He has been fitted into
a long-standing paradigm of Japanese baseball – one so well-encapsulated by the 1994
television documentary quoted above – and this essay explores this national
characterization of the sport in Japan.

The imagery of samurai baseball has been potent, and it has been usefully deployed
inside and outside the baseball world and Japan for both moral suasion and critique.
Analysts of the sport must take it seriously but not literally. It is a long-standing
ideological construct of national sporting style, and not a straightforward description
of what occurs on Japanese ball fields. It plays fast and loose with logic and with
history; it deflects attention from the many other levels of the game in Japan; and,
perhaps most dangerously, it reduces sporting style to national character. In this essay
I will consider these difficulties in turn.

Samurai with Bats

To scholars outside the world of Japanese baseball, a notion of samurai baseball may
seem like a parody rather than a paradigm, but within this baseball world, to
foreigners and Japanese alike, it has been taken rather seriously for a long time as an
accurate image of the way the sport is played – or at least should be played – in Japan.
The vocabulary of baseball in Japan is a complex patois of English-derived terms (e.g.
faasuto or first means the first baseman position) and indigenous terms (the Japanese
word dageki is used for batting), but for a century, the Sino-Japanese character
compound yakyu/C22 rather than English-derived beesubooru (baseball) has been the
name of the sport. And when commentators and practitioners begin to wax
philosophically, they start talking about yakyu-dō or the ’Way of Baseball’.

There is much consensus about the elements of the code of sporting conduct for the
Way of Baseball. It involves, first, a spiritualization of hard work and intense practice.
It demands an abiding loyalty to the team and abject obedience to manager and
coaches. It is an obsession with form and a doggedly conservative, run-by-run playing
strategy. Much importance is to be placed on face and face-saving, and ties are to be
valued for mutual face-saving. And finally, the Japanese Way of Baseball instils an
intense and insular national pride, with strong prejudice against those foreign players
who are begrudgingly signed to the rosters but systematically denigrated.

Certainly sport everywhere, and team sports especially, place a premium on
intensity, loyalty, self-sacrifice and honour, but many observers feel that the Japanese
Way of Baseball carries these values to pathological degrees. And the samurai sobriquet is used deliberately and provocatively by Japanese and foreigners alike as a condensed symbol and historical referent of this code of sporting conduct. For most Japanese, it endows the felt virtues of proper playing and managing with meaningful virtuous ideals of the indigenous past. At the same time, it is not hard to imagine how an American critic of the Japanese game can represent each of these tenets as an inversion of the proper spirit of the game. The Japanese creed is grinding work, while Americans ‘play ball’. Japanese deference to managers contrasts with the players-first freedom of Major League Baseball. Japanese small-ball conservatism is a timid version of American bold, risk-taking power-ball. Japanese play to tie; Americans play all out to win. The parochial nationalism of Japanese teams is opposed to the tolerant, multi-ethnic composition of MLB.

And this judgemental binary is often extended to other unflattering contrasts: to Japanese fans as slavish fanatical ‘groupies’; to Japanese front offices, which are ignorant of baseball and pawns of a parent company; to corporate minions of the parent company, who only want compliant players, good PR and a modicum of profit; to a sensationalist press, which prefers scandal to sport and which pursues its prey in a frenzied pack; and to umpires who are ill-trained and unwilling and unable to apply rules fairly.

On closer inspection, however, the particular tenets of ‘samurai baseball’ are a wilful and often convenient mix of fact and fancy. It is often the case, for instance, that professional teams place greater emphasis on coordinated practice, mechanics, conditioning and form than MLB teams, but this is due more to organizational differences than character traits. There are no minor leagues in Japan – each club has a large roster (65–70 players) divided into a first team and a second team (kind of a ‘junior varsity’) – and this requires more organization, regulation and instruction even at this ‘major league’ level than on an MLB club. In this regard, Japanese baseball shares an organizational structure and training styles with professional American NFL football rather than US baseball. [2]

The alleged cultural preference for playing to a face-saving tie is also dubious. It is true that for many decades, professional baseball in Japan had extra-innings limits on its games, unlike MLB, which resulted in occasional ties. However, this was not because it produced a desired outcome (indeed, it is a rather odd injunction for a samurai who is supposed to be defending the honour of his overlord!) but because almost all spectators came to games via public transportation (often the streetcars and trains owned by the team’s parent company), and the leagues felt responsibility to ensure that the games ended while the transport was still running. (There were also neighbourhood anti-noise ordinances that limited late-night games.)

Even so, draws were infrequent; a calculation of game results since the beginning of professional play in 1937 reveals that only 4–5 per cent of all contests have actually ended in ties. If ever there were sports that might be accused of playing for ties, they would be American football, NHL hockey and European soccer; in all three, until the recent introduction of sudden-death overtime or tie-breaking penalty shots, ties were
far more common, often accounting for up to one-third of a season’s outcomes. One could hardly associate tie results with face-saving ethics in these leagues.

And what of the claims of anti-foreign bias and ethnic insularity? There is certainly evidence for this in recent decades, but the contrast rests on some convenient amnesia about the sport in the USA. Indeed, Japanese baseball was actually more open and multi-ethnic in the 1920s and 1930s than the US MLB game, which was closed to black Caribbeans, to Hispanics and to African-Americans.

Nonetheless, logic and veracity are not necessarily measures of the power of imagery, and to appreciate both the historical depth and the limited relevance of the claims of samurai baseball, we must assess more fully its place in the social history of the sport.

**Imaging Samurai Baseball**

Baseball was introduced into Japan in the 1870s by a few Japanese who had been to the US and by several Americans who were teaching in Japanese schools. [3] By the late 1880s, elite preparatory schools encouraged self-organized clubs by their students for a number of Western-derived sports, of which baseball was only one. Not surprisingly, the primary association of sports with schools led to an emphasis on their capacities for developing moral strength as well as physical vigour. Indeed as Ikuo Abe and J.A. Mangan have detailed, there were direct lines of inspiration from English and American notions of sportsmanship as the school sports clubs began to frame and defend their activities in a language of character and character building. [4] As in England and the US, athleticism and a sense that games-playing could inspire virtue, hard work and obedience, and could develop manliness, came to prevail in the elite schools, which were the training grounds for the new political, military and business elites.

The emergence of baseball as the prestige school sport and the articulation of its proper ethos in a ‘samurai’ idiom occurred around the turn of the twentieth century and might, in simplest terms, be attributed to a particular contest and a particular book. The contest was the now famous first meeting of the Japanese schoolboys of the country’s most elite preparatory school, Tokyo’s First Higher School, and a club of American adults, drawn from military, diplomatic and commercial residents in the foreign trading port of Yokohama, some 30 miles from the new capital, just connected by the country’s first railroad line. The school had been playing baseball for a decade and its team, run by the students themselves, had cultivated a reputation for constant practice and extreme effort. It gradually ran out of rival schools who could offer challenging competition; hence its request for an exhibition game with the Americans.

The schoolboys took the train down to Yokohama on 23 May 1896 and walked up the hill from the port station to a recreational park maintained by and for the Western foreigners only. Without proper equipment and significantly undersized, the Japanese schoolboys nonetheless shocked the Americans by beating them soundly. A rematch two weeks later and a third game in late June were even more lopsided in
favour of the Japanese. By then, word had spread through the capital region, and the students and their club were feted as national celebrities. At a moment when Japan was renegotiating its unequal treaties with Western powers, forging a national political culture around a divine emperor cult, developing a national education system to inculcate values of subjecthood and aggressively expanding Japanese control onto the Asian continent, it is easy to appreciate that beating Americans at their own game could be accorded political significance. All in all, the First Higher School team played 13 games against the Americans over eight years up to 1904, losing only twice. It secured for its team, for its school and especially for its sport enormous attention and national prestige. [5]

The book that for many came to articulate the virtues of the code of the baseball warrior actually made no references to baseball, and it was in fact an odd text to underwrite a century of sports imagery. *Bushido: The Soul of the Japan* appeared in 1900, and was written in English by Inazo Nitobe, a Japanese Christian bureaucrat and educator who had been schooled in the United States and in Germany, was married to an American Quaker woman and remained an ardent internationalist. [6] Courage, sincerity, self-discipline, honour and loyalty were among the ethics that Nitobe associated with the samurai class, ironically to emphasize the parallels and affinities rather than the stark differences between Japanese ethics and Western ethics. Translated into Japanese, however, it proved a tempting and powerful moral idiom to expound the spiritualism of this new Japanese style baseball at a historical moment.

As Robert Whiting and others have detailed in a rich literature on twentieth-century Japanese baseball, this samurai imagery has remained central to many self-representations and outside criticisms of the sport as it spread through the school system (becoming prominent in middle schools and, later, high schools), as it developed at the professional level from the 1930s and as it became popular for youth at the Little League level and for adult amateurs through a national network of company teams and industrial leagues. [7] It was expressed in scholarly writings about baseball, in the powerful daily sports newspapers (for which professional baseball has been a front-page mainstay since their appearance in the late 1940s), in the rich veins of media commentaries and participant memoirs within the baseball world and in the popular culture that surrounds the sports, especially in the extensive cartoon book and animation movies on baseball themes since the 1960s.

**The Limits of Japanese Baseball as Samurai with Bats**

An ideology of baseball behaviour phrased as a uniquely Japanese rendition of traditional warrior values is deeply intriguing to any sports scholar. It certainly resonates with a far more extensive deployment of the samurai image in modern Japan to inspire students, workers, soldiers and citizen-subjects. And the temptation is great to take it at face value, to accord it broad salience and to attribute to it overriding significance in describing and explaining Japan’s national pastime. It is, however, a temptation worth resisting for at least five reasons.
First, the twentieth-century idealization of warrior virtues has been part of a cultural politics of heritage that requires considerable historical amnesia. The modern-day samurai since Nitobe, in whatever venue, is a sanitized and simplified revival of a far more varied historical canvas, a millennium of warriors of all types and dispositions. [8]

Most especially, expressions of samurai baseball came to foreground a small set of moral imperatives that ignored other values equally prominent in medieval and early modern codes of conduct – loyalty to authority rather than sincerity to self-honour, hyper-exertion rather than self-restraint and formal patterns over execution and results. [9] There are obvious reasons why a team sport (or an emperor state) might be so selective, but it is as partial a historical nostalgia as has been the modern American idealization of the cowboy.

Even the narrowing of putative samurai codes to loyalty and the self-sacrifice it should entail for players has proven slippery because organizational circumstances opportunistically shifted the object of that loyalty and deference. Initially, loyalty was to inhere in the horizontal ties of mutual sacrifice among the student-run school baseball clubs of the late nineteenth century. Then, in the early twentieth century, the new university clubs evolved into leadership by an adult manager, who was often a player alumnus who exacted a vertical authority. In the 1920s and early 1930s a number of Tokyo universities moved back to coachless organizations, and loyalty again became a bond of association rather than a demand for deference. In the second half of the century, most high-school teams were rigidly structured around strong single adult managers aided by rigid senior-junior lines of privilege and deference among the players (who can number up to 70 or 80); the professional leagues, on the other hand, developed corporate, impersonal authority structures (so-called kanri yakyū or managed baseball) of managers below an ownership corporation and a baseball front office and above a large coaching staff and player roster. In short, even the conveniently edited version of warrior virtues was constantly retrofitted for more pragmatic than principled purposes across a wide range of sports organizations and authority structures.

A third consideration that opens up a broader social history of Japanese history is that insistence on a samurai way of baseball may have been the dominant playing ideology of the early to mid-twentieth century, but it was not unopposed by other philosophies. Not all schools, universities and coaches were persuaded of its virtues, and there was a much wider field of playing philosophies, strategies and training styles. Official and media debates through these decades about charging admission, about the propriety of tactics such as base-stealing, about an emphasis on winning at all costs, about university recruitment of high-school players and about other volatile issues point to the possibilities of a much more open social history of the sport than we have to date. [10]

In part, this open field of continuing controversy was fuelled by the extensive contacts and mutual influence between the spheres of Japanese and American baseball that intersected from about 1905 to the late 1930s to a much greater degree
than generally acknowledged by those wedded to a history of samurai baseball. The new steamship routes between Yokohama and San Francisco and Seattle through Honolulu regularly brought teams in both directions on lengthy exhibition tours. These cross-Pacific ties fostered continuing exchanges among the overlapping worlds of baseball among Japanese universities, the Hawaiian Islands, the Japanese-American communities of the West Coast and the extensive range of collegiate and semi-professional teams across the US. It was, as Sayuri Guthrie-Shimizu has aptly termed it, a ‘transnational baseball fraternity’. [11]

A final factor that challenges the ideology of samurai baseball and undermines its explanatory power was the rapid and relentless commercialization of school baseball over these same decades. University derbies and league tournaments in the Tokyo and Osaka region, visiting American teams, new national newspapers that used sports promotions in subscription wars and featured sports news prominently, construction of stadiums in the expanding metropolitan areas and, by the late 1920s, live radio transmissions – these and other developments perpetuated an image of exuberant athleticism, pure amateurism and adolescent loyalty even as they seriously compromised those very qualities. [12] Most emblematic of this was the inauguration of a national middle-school summer tournament in 1915 by one of these new national newspapers, Asahi. This was immediately matched by a spring national tournament by its rival, Mainichi, and by 1924 both moved to the new 55,000-capacity Kōshien Stadium, one of the largest in the world at the time. In much the same way that Michael Oriard has shown how American university football became a national sport through the promotion and mediation of the press (and urban developers and new transportation), Japanese baseball became edu-tainment. Pedagogy and profit were inextricably mixed in the selling of samurai baseball. [13]

Samurai Redux: The Yomiuri Giants in the 1960s

As with rugby in Britain and American football in the US, baseball did not develop a professional league until well after the amateur sport had taken root and established conventional playing styles and ethics. In Japan it was not until the late 1930s that a league of company-sponsored teams emerged, and it was quickly overtaken and eventually suspended by the war. Baseball was resurrected soon after Japan’s defeat and encouraged by the American occupation, and in the 1950s it became a popular form of urban entertainment, a staple of media reporting and important programming for the spread of television.

Overt samurai talk was not much evident in the early post-war years, for obvious reasons, although several of the most successful team managers of this era developed and applied coaching styles that implicitly drew from their own soldier experiences. But it wasn’t until the particular conditions of the 1960s and early 1970s that a new form of samurai baseball, more corporate than feudal, became dominant. This was when the game and the business of the game were fundamentally reshaped by one team, the Yomiuri Giants, and its parent company, the Yomiuri media conglomerate,
during the team’s unprecedented reign as national champion for nine consecutive years, from 1965 to 1973. The so-called ‘V-9’ Giants were led by two of the greatest players ever, Oh Sadaharu and Nagashima Shigeo, and their popularity was assured by the backing of the Yomiuri companies, the most powerful news and entertainment organization in the country. The V-9 Giants were managed by Kawakami Tetsuharu, who had been known during his player years as the ‘god of hitting’. As manager, Kawakami quickly became famous for a style of authoritarian leadership called ‘managed baseball’ (kanri yakyū). He demanded (or at least, appeared to demand) iron discipline, arduous practices, stolid teamwork and a conservative playing strategy.

The V-9 Giants totally dominated the league and thoroughly reshaped the image of professional baseball. Even that was not enough, however. By coincidence, the Giants’ pre-eminence precisely mapped the post-war economy’s double-digit growth years that catapulted the country to the first rank of industrial powers. In the aftermath of the 1964 Tokyo Olympics, during the boom years of the government’s ‘double-your-income’ policies, through the national crises of the Nixon shocks and the first oil crisis of 1974, the Giants were a lightning-rod for national prestige and patriotic pride.

Yomiuri went to great effort to package and present the team as supremely talented, tautly disciplined and relentlessly efficient. The Giants’ success was celebrated as a powerful synecdoche for the confident, industrious society and competitive, resurgent economy that Japan saw itself becoming. And indeed, seemingly directed by a martial general-like manager and a full complement of staff-officer coaches, the Giants projected a player image and a playing style that was coordinated, committed and collective. [14]

The point is that this image was deliberately portrayed to resonate powerfully with and to serve as testimony to a larger business image, which came to called ‘Japan-style management’. That is, this same moment, the mid- to late 1960s, was precisely the period when business people and commentators began to revise the image of ‘the Japanese company system’ not as an inefficient, tradition-bound anachronism but as a Japanese accomplishment and an effective positive alternative to Western corporate forms and distinctive. What Japanese and foreign commentators alike had disparaged as inefficient primordial rigidities were now being spun into a potent and prescient ‘Confucian corporatism’ that would be a new standard for late-capitalist organization. The key features of this form of economic organization were touted as building strength through solidarity, including full-career employment (creating a sense of mutual fate); bottom-up entry by school leavers (not lateral mid-career shifts); hiring by general educational credentials (not specific skills); and pay and promotion by seniority (these were age-grade organizations).

The Giants epitomized how tempting a venue professional baseball was for performing such corporate-style authority and for exacting exemplary discipline. Samurai with briefcases were to be inspired by samurai with bats. Other clubs and their parent companies were led to attempt similar changes in club organization, with more or less enthusiasm and with more or less success. This was corporate-style
authority and corporate prestige explicitly invested in and demonstrated through the subsidiary ball clubs.

Yet however widely promoted, this corporate rendition of samurai baseball was never accepted at face value. The baseball world, the media that surround it and the fans who follow it received it with varying measures of reverence, scepticism and cynicism. Even the realities of Yomiuri baseball were more complex. Backstage, it was well known that Kawakami gave his stars considerable leeway to practise and play in their own fashion. A number of them, such as Masaichi Kaneda and Isao Harimoto, had been poached from other teams, revealing how loyalty was to be honoured only in the breach. Below a surface harmony was little genuine affection and much internecine struggle among players, coaches and the manager. [15] Sadaharu Oh mentioned in passing in his English-language autobiography that in the 20 years that he and Nagashima played together they never went out drinking together a single evening. [16] And the headlines of a pure 'Japanese' team papered over the fact that the roster included players of mixed parentage and stigmatized minorities within Japan, including stars such as Oh himself (half-Chinese and a Taiwan citizen), Kaneda (a Korean resident of Japan) and Harimoto (also a Korean resident of Japan).

An equally important limitation of relying on this imagery to characterize and analyse professional baseball is that even as a representation of a dominant style it doesn’t begin to capture what is distinctive and what is captivating about the shape and the appeal of the sport in that decade and since. This has been made evident to me in my own research on professional baseball in what is now Japan’s second region, that of the tri-city area of Osaka, Kyoto and Kobe, home to four of the 12 professional teams in the early 1950s. Mergers and moves have recently reduced that to two, the Hanshin Tigers in the Central League and the Orix Buffaloes in the decidedly less popular Pacific League.

Hanshin in particular has long stood in stark contrast to the ethos and image of the Yomiuri Giants, breeding the most popular and most profitable rivalry in the sport over the last five decades. The Hanshin Tigers are based in Kōshien Stadium, constructed by the parent transportation and retail company for school baseball back in the 1920s on the edge of a growing Osaka metropolis. As Tokyo became Japan’s single centre in the 1960s, Osaka fell into a second-city complex that Hanshin, in its rivalry with the Giants, came to reflect. The Tigers became a mirror-opposite of their capital rivals – owned by a small corporation, which intruded ineptly in club affairs, controlled by an often dysfunctional front office, performing poorly year after year on the ‘sacred ground’ of Kōshien and yet remaining the centrepiece of a voracious and prying Osaka sports media and followed by the most knowledgeable and passionate fans in the game, organized in fearless, critical and autonomous supporter associations. [17]

Hanshin baseball, to its participants, media and followers, has never been about embodying samurai values and corporate image and national prestige. For many, it was a long-running, richly textured, melodramatic sports soap opera, resonant with the daily frustrations of workplaces everywhere in the region and symbolic of the struggles of a second-city team. A certain nobility as well as resignation has been
claimed for playing and supporting Hanshin baseball, but the legacy of samurai imagery was very seldom used as an idiom of expression. In five years of field research among players, executives, reporters and fans, I heard much about the ways of Hansin baseball but very little about the ‘Way of Japanese Baseball’. It is true that when prompted, one of the team’s managers of those years, the former Hall of Fame shortstop Yoshio Yoshida, could wax poetically about the tenets of samurai baseball to a foreign anthropologist, but he was also candid about how little a role they played in his everyday talk and practices in running the team. Of course, he looked for mental toughness, team commitment, willingness to follow orders and the host of skills and dispositions required for adequacy and success. However, he phrased these in idioms of effort and professionalism that would be familiar to most MLB managers.

Character or Caricature?

Listening to Yoshida and watching the daily routines of Hanshin baseball was an important lesson, as obvious as it has been ignored by those who would reduce the forms of the sport in Japan to its most frequently articulated national stereotype. Obvious, in that any careful observer will immediately note the clearly distinguishing and compelling differences and solidarities at every point in the scale of the sport, among individual players, within and across teams and leagues and regions. There is further variation across levels of the game, from boys playing Little League to high-school nines vying for the national tournament to Hanshin pros and the rural farmers I played with in a community league at five o’clock in the morning before heading for the rice paddies. And there is a third vector of variation through the temporal rhythms of individual careers, team histories, and the eras of the sport.

Nonetheless, it is undeniable that samurai baseball has been a powerful rhetoric for over a century of the sport in Japan; and it is yet another instance of the capacity of modern sports to embody interests and anxieties of national prestige and national identity by metonymic claims that certain personal qualities and interpersonal values can be elevated to the status of enduring national character and collective personality. National styling may be even more important in a sporting world such as baseball, which is neither global like soccer nor Commonwealth in scale like cricket. In contrast, it is an international sport with a single centre of enormous power, the United States and MLB, and a periphery of national baseball societies in the Caribbean and the Pacific that are forced to define and defend their interests and their identities vis-à-vis the dominant and alluring centre. Surely, samurai baseball from its initial articulation in the late nineteenth century has been a form of ‘uncanny mimicry’ that is a strategic response to the US and the MLB. [18] The point that I wish to emphasize here, however, is that it serves us poorly when applied to the domestic history and internal dynamics of the sport in Japan. We must be sceptical of the motivations of those in and out of the Japanese baseball world who would promote a singular ethos of samurai baseball. It must be placed in critical context rather than serve as the context for our analyses.
Samurai baseball is not national character but rather it is self-serving caricature. Those who are content with that image might be reminded of the caution voiced by the historian John Dower, writing of the collective portraits of the Japanese people generated by the Japanese government and certain Japanese scholars in the 1930s and often eagerly embraced by foreigners seeking shorthand keys and rationales for judgment and action. His words stand as a powerful corrective to the words of the 1994 baseball documentary that opened this essay:

It was not that the Japanese people were, in actuality, homogeneous and harmonious, devoid of individuality and thoroughly subordinated to the group, but rather that the Japanese ruling groups were constantly exhorting them to become so. Indeed, the government deemed it necessary to draft and propagate a rigid orthodoxy of this sort precisely because a great many Japanese did not cherish the more traditional virtues of loyalty and filial piety under the emperor. . . . What the vast majority of Westerners believed the Japanese to be coincided with what the Japanese ruling elites hoped they would become. [19]

Notes

[1] This is the opening narration of a 1994 television documentary, *Baseball in Japan*, produced, directed and written by Tony Howard. The documentary was broadcast widely on public television in the United States.
[7] Among the works of Whiting, see *The Chrysanthemum and the Bat; You’ve Gotta Have Wa*; and ‘The Samurai Way of Baseball and the National Character Debate’. See also Sakuta, ‘Kokō yakyū to seishin-shūgi’.
[10] With a few important exceptions such as Kiku, *Kindai puro supōtsu no rekishi shakaigaku*; Kanno, *Bushidō no gyakushū*.
[14] Iwakawa, ‘Nihonjin to Kyojin-gun (1)’; and Iwakawa, ‘Nihonjin to Kyojin-gun (2)’. A partial translation of these articles appeared as Iwakawa, ‘The Mystique of the Yomiuri Giants’.
References


